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[781] 
Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders 
Aaron H. Caplan* 
Every year, U.S. courts entertain hundreds of thousands of petitions for civil harassment 
orders, i.e., injunctions issued upon the request of any person against any other person in 
response to words or behavior deemed harassing. Definitions of “harassment” vary 
widely, but an often-used statutory formula defines it as “a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves 
no legitimate purpose.” Civil harassment statutes can protect the safety, privacy, and 
autonomy of victims, but when courts declare that speech is harassing, or issue 
injunctions against future speech on grounds that it would harass, they may violate 
constitutional rules against vagueness, overbreadth, and prior restraint. Unfortunately, 
civil harassment litigation includes structural features that cause courts to systematically 
underestimate the free speech dangers. 
 
This Article proposes methods to interpret and apply civil harassment statutes that will 
avoid most serious free speech problems. The key is to define harassment as unconsented 
contact or surveillance that endangers safety and privacy. The long-established tort and 
criminal law concepts of battery, assault, threats, trespass, and intrusion into seclusion lie 
at the core of this definition. Conduct resembling outrage (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress) lies at the periphery. Speech about the victim directed to other listeners 
(especially defamation and malicious prosecution) falls outside the definition altogether. 
By focusing on the nature of the contact between the parties, rather than on the content of 
one party's allegedly harassing speech, courts will be better able to apply civil harassment 
statutes in a constitutionally acceptable manner. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am grateful for the helpful 
ideas of David Ball, Anne Bloom, Charlotte Garden, Hon. Carol Boas Goodson, Paul Hayden, Nina 
Kohn, David Loy, Scott Michelman, Alexandra Natapoff, Jennifer Rothman, David Sloss, Marcy 
Strauss, Art Spitzer, Nancy Talner, Joe Tommasino, Michael Waterstone, and workshop participants 
at Santa Clara Law School, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and the Southern California 
Junior Law Faculty Workshop. Thanks also for research assistance from Joshua Anderson, Katherine 
Faulds, Christina Goebelsmann, Tiffany Lee, Adam Steinbaugh, and Jason Wong. 
782 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:781 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 782 
I.  Civil Harassment Orders in Theory and Practice ......................... 787 
A.  The Evolution and Structure of Civil Harassment 
Statutes ..................................................................................... 790 
B.  Civil Harassment Litigation in Practice ............................ 796 
II.  First Amendment Problems Posed by Civil Harassment 
Orders .................................................................................................... 808 
A.  Vagueness ................................................................................. 810 
B.  Overbreadth ............................................................................. 817 
C.  Prior Restraint ........................................................................ 824 
III.  Methods to Avoid Speech Violations ............................................. 826 
A.  The Core and Periphery of Civil Harassment ................... 828 
B.  Replacing Content with Contacts ...................................... 838 
C.  Injunctions Against Contact, Not Expression ................. 842 
D.  A Case Study ............................................................................ 843 
IV.  Recommendations ............................................................................... 845 
A.  Ideas for Courts ...................................................................... 847 
B.  Ideas for Legislatures ........................................................... 852 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 854 
Statutory Appendix ................................................................................... 856 
 
Introduction 
Every year, U.S. courts entertain hundreds of thousands of petitions 
for what I call civil harassment orders.1 Local jurisdictions apply various 
labels to these edicts—no-contact orders, restraining orders, protection 
orders, stalking orders, peace orders, and more—but all are injunctions 
issued upon the request of any person against any other person, 
regardless of their relationship, in response to words or behavior deemed 
harassing. Definitions of “harassment” vary widely, but an often-used 
statutory formula is a “course of conduct directed at a specific person 
which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves 
no legitimate purpose.”2 Twenty-three states have statutes authorizing 
courts to issue civil harassment orders,3 and some courts issue similar 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 2. S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-4 (2012); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6 (West 2012). 
Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (9th ed. 2009) adopts a similar definition: “Words, conduct, or action 
(usu. repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes 
substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” 
 3. See infra Statutory Appendix. 
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orders through their general equitable powers in the absence of statutory 
authority.4 Despite the prevalence of these orders and despite the 
considerable scholarly literature surrounding other areas of law that use 
the term “harassment” (most notably sexual harassment under Title 
VII), no previous legal scholarship has carefully examined civil 
harassment statutes.5 
Civil harassment orders are cousins to domestic violence restraining 
orders, but they differ in important respects. Any person may seek a civil 
harassment order against any other person—whether or not they have 
had an intimate relationship—in response to a wide range of behavior, 
typically unspecified, that need not involve violence or threatened violence 
and can consist of words alone. Through an unlimited range of potential 
defendants, a tremendous breadth of covered conduct, and an extensive 
scope of available remedies, civil harassment statutes cast an extremely 
wide net. 
Without a doubt, the net captures much conduct that may properly be 
deemed unlawful and remedied by an injunction against further 
unconsented contact. For example, Clifford De Louis of suburban Atlanta 
waged a campaign of aggravation against his next-door neighbor Alice 
Sheppard. When Sheppard or her family were in their yard, De Louis 
intentionally blared loud music from speakers pointed in their direction 
and ran his leaf blower even when there were no leaves. He stood in his 
driveway staring menacingly at Sheppard for long periods of time, made 
lewd crotch-grabbing gestures, and yelled inappropriate sexualized 
comments to her children.6 In South Dakota, William Liechti disliked 
neighbor children who drove noisy four-wheelers. On several occasions he 
chased one of the children home, and on another occasion he cornered 
several of them in a parking lot with his pickup truck, forcing them to 
escape through a wheat field. He habitually watched them through 
binoculars, even when they were not driving their four-wheelers. On a 
single day, he drove by the neighbors’ house thirty-five times, and at 
times he would make four or five phone calls a day to the parents.7 
In these and many other cases,8 no-contact orders can forestall 
violence and protect the safety, privacy, dignity, and autonomy of 
victims—just as domestic violence orders can.9 In most circumstances in 
which they are granted, the orders pose no constitutional problems. But 
 
 4. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 6. See De Louis v. Sheppard, 627 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 7. See Schaefer ex rel. S.S. v. Liechti, 711 N.W.2d 257, 259–60 (S.D. 2006). 
 8. For other examples of neighbors bedeviling each other, see Robert F. Blomquist, Extreme 
American Neighborhood Law, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 335 (2009). 
 9. Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for 
Reform, 23 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 93, 119–25 (2005) (identifying benefits); see Christopher T. Benitez 
et al., Do Protection Orders Protect?, 38 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 376 (2010) (compiling studies). 
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like any tool, they may be misused or overused. The risk of misuse has 
First Amendment ramifications when courts declare that speech itself is 
harassing, or issue injunctions against future speech on grounds that it 
would harass. For example: 
 After an acrimonious divorce, an ex-wife called local police, 
prosecutors, and emergency shelters to express fears about her ex-
husband (a police officer). She also wrote a letter to the editor of 
the local newspaper on the topic of domestic violence, which the 
ex-husband believed contained thinly veiled references to him. He 
responded with a civil harassment petition, claiming that the ex-
wife’s statements about him were false and had caused him 
substantial emotional distress. The trial court found harassment 
and enjoined the ex-wife from “knowingly and willfully making 
invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints [about the 
ex-husband] to third parties.”10 
 A small-town mayor alleged harassment by a local resident because 
at a city council meeting the resident had been “asking questions, 
requesting copies of ordinances, telling council members they 
should resign so more qualified people could serve, making a 
racially insensitive remark, and staring at [the mayor] with ‘little 
beady eyes.’”11 The trial court ordered the resident to stay 100 
yards away from the mayor, which prevented him from attending 
public meetings or conducting business in City Hall.12 
 A woman posted material on a website decrying “all the bull[y]ing 
and harassing that goes on in our school system.” She accused a 
middle school girl of being a bully, saying: “Wasn’t this the student 
that harassed the Cantrell child? And we wonder why some kids 
hate to go to school.” The girl’s mother filed a petition on behalf of 
herself and her daughter. The trial court found harassment and 
ordered the writer “to cease entering comments on her website 
regarding [the girl] or other members of plaintiff’s family.”13 
 
 10. In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161, 164 (Wash. 2004). Disclosure: I was counsel for the ex-
wife. See Evans v. Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (deputy sheriff obtains order 
against ex-wife forbidding “false and defamatory” statements); Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
619, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (landlord obtains order against activists who distributed “false and 
misleading” handbills mentioning landlord); Bovi v. Parask, No. C5-98-1616, 1999 WL 289245, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (ex-wife obtains order forbidding ex-husband’s new wife from making 
“false or misleading” reports about ex-wife to any person or law enforcement agency and from 
contacting ex-wife’s employer or any potential employer). 
 11. Gullickson v. Kline, 678 N.W.2d 138, 139 (N.D. 2004).  
 12. See id. at 143; see also Vill. of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 565 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1997) (affirming a civil harassment order barring lawsuits against a municipality and its officers). 
 13. Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 924, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); see Devereaux v. Rodriguez, 
No. G038462, 2008 WL 2756476, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2008) (“The [trial] court [restraining 
order forbade] posting or publishing personal information about [petitioner] on the Internet or to any 
third party.”); Johnson v. Arlotta, No. A11-630, 2011 WL 6141651, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2011) (“The [restraining order] . . . prohibits . . . [a]ny email or other electronic message contact with 
third-parties that contains any material concerning [petitioner] that affects or intends to adversely 
affect [her] safety, security, or privacy”); Massey v. Wakely, 2002 WL 378371, at *1 (Wis. App. Mar. 
12, 2002) (neighbor obtains order forbidding neighbor from using his likeness or publishing 
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 A political activist was gathering signatures to trigger a recall of a 
mayor. A city council member opposed the recall, publicly referring 
to the activist as “a bigot, fascist, homophobe, and Nazi.” The trial 
court issued an injunction against the council member, reasoning 
that his words “could be found annoying by a reasonable person.”14 
Civil harassment law exhibits two traits that should trigger careful 
constitutional review. First, Madsen v. Women’s Health Center explained 
that courts should apply a “somewhat more stringent application of 
general First Amendment principles” to speech-restrictive injunctions than 
to speech-restrictive statutes.15 Second, statutes with the potential to reach 
huge swaths of daily life often provoke judicial suspicion. For example, 
United States v. Alvarez invalidated a statute prohibiting individuals from 
falsely claiming to have earned military honors, in part because it applied 
to statements “made at any time, in any place, to any person.”16 For the 
Supreme Court, “the sweeping, quite unprecedented reach of the statute 
puts it in conflict with the First Amendment.”17 Despite the need for 
careful scrutiny, civil harassment decisions in practice often disregard or 
undervalue their impact on constitutional rights. 
Many structural factors of civil harassment litigation lead to higher-
than-usual risk of constitutional error. As with family law,18 civil 
harassment law has a way of encouraging some judges to dispense free-
wheeling, Solomonic justice according to their visions of proper behavior 
and the best interests of the parties. Judges’ legal instincts are not helped 
by the accelerated and abbreviated procedures required by the statutes. 
The parties are rarely represented by counsel, and ex parte orders are 
encouraged, which means courts may not hear the necessary facts and 
legal arguments.19 Very few civil harassment cases lead to appeals, let 
alone appeals with published opinions.20 As a result, civil harassment law 
tends to operate with a shortage of two things we ordinarily rely upon to 
ensure accurate decisionmaking by trial courts: the adversary system and 
appellate review. 
 
information concerning him). 
 14. LaFaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56, 58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); see Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 
678, 680 (N.D. 1994) (after a teenager calls a classmate “Dumbo” and builds snow figures making fun of 
his big ears, court issues no-contact order including ban on “any other conduct which injures the 
Petitioner, either physically or emotionally”). 
 15. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). See infra note 309 and 
accompanying text. 
 16. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).  
 17. Id.; see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (holding a third-party child visitation 
statute unconstitutional as “breathtakingly broad”). 
 18. See generally Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (2006). 
 19. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
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These structural features also explain why, despite its extensive 
reach, civil harassment law has been virtually invisible to the bar, bench, 
and academia. The statutes are encountered by only a small segment of 
the private bar, none of the federal judiciary, and at most a sliver of the 
state appellate judiciary. No previous law review articles have focused 
exclusively on civil harassment statutes,21 even though a thriving literature 
exists around domestic violence22 and sexual harassment.23 The current 
inattention echoes an observation made fifty years ago by the drafters of 
the Model Penal Code, when proposing a misdemeanor they called 
“Harassment”: 
[This area] had received little systematic consideration by legislators, 
judges, or scholars. The penalties involved were generally minor, the 
defendants usually came from the lower social and economic levels, and 
appeals were consequently infrequent. . . . [Nonetheless,] [o]ffenses in 
this category affect a large number of defendants, involve a great 
proportion of public activity, and powerfully influence the view of public 
justice held by millions of people.24 
Consequently, one goal of this Article is to help trial judges identify 
important issues that unschooled and unrepresented parties may not be 
 
 21. My research unearthed only two sources that devote more than a few paragraphs to civil 
harassment statutes. One is an acerbic essay by a Missouri trial judge, some of which is devoted to that 
state’s civil harassment statute. See David H. Dunlap, Trends in Adult Abuse and Child Protection, 
66 UMKC L. Rev. 1 (1997). The portion of the article dealing with civil harassment laments that the 
statute encourages petitions from “chronic malcontents, artful blame-shifters, professional victims, 
nonclinical paranoids and knavish opportunists . . . begging succor from the unavoidable woes of 
everyday life.” Id. at 4. A later article from the Journal of the Missouri Bar observed that Judge 
Dunlap expressed “a cynical view” (one might have said “a misanthropic view”) of civil harassment. 
Damon Phillips, Civil Protection Orders: Issues in Obtainment, Enforcement and Effectiveness, 
61 J. Mo. B. 29, 38 (2005). 
  The other source is a valuable but unpublished empirical study of a year’s worth of civil 
harassment petitions in a single court of limited jurisdiction, prepared by that court’s staff attorney as 
a graduation requirement for the Court Executive Development Program of the National Center for 
State Courts. Joe Tommasino, Protection Order or Chaos? The TPO Processing Experience in the 
Las Vegas Justice Court and Its Larger Implications for Nevada Law (May 2010), available at 
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/famct&CISOPTR=295. 
  Beyond Judge Dunlap’s article and the Las Vegas study, civil harassment statutes receive only 
brief mentions within articles chiefly devoted to other statutes. See, e.g., Melvin Huang, Keeping 
Stalkers at Bay in Texas, 15 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 53, 75 (2009); Devon M. Largio, Refining the Meaning 
and Application of “Dating Relationship” Language in Domestic Violence Statutes, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 
939, 955 (2007). 
 22. See Therese A. Clarke, Why Won’t Someone Help Me?: The Unspeakable Epidemic of 
Domestic Violence: An Annotated Bibliography, 23 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 529, 529 (2003) (“As I began 
examining the literature in this area I realized that I could not cover it all. There is just too much.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel, Directions in Sexual Harassment 
Law (2004); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 548 (2001). Periodic updates can be found in the Annotated Legal Bibliography on Gender, 
published in most issues of the Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender. 
 24. Model Penal Code § 250 introductory note (1980). On the importance of lower-profile legal 
proceedings, see Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1325–27 (2012). 
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raising. Another is to invite greater scholarly attention to an understudied 
area. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I describes civil harassment 
statutes in theory and in practice. After exploring their history and 
language, this Part examines the structural and procedural features that 
lead courts to systematically underestimate the constitutional risks of 
civil harassment litigation. 
Part II identifies the risks that civil harassment statutes pose to 
freedom of speech, using the familiar headings of vagueness, overbreadth, 
and prior restraint. Constitutional violations are sure to arise if statutes 
are interpreted and applied—as they often are—to allow injunctions 
(against any activity) in response to (unspecified) behavior that makes 
others feel (generally) bad. 
Part III proposes ways to interpret and apply the statutes to avoid 
these problems. The key is a definition of harassment built around 
unconsented contact or surveillance that endangers safety and privacy. As 
used here, “contact” takes the meaning it has in the typical no-contact 
order: in-person interaction, or the direction of messages to the 
petitioner through other media including but not limited to phone, mail, 
messenger, or electronic communications. To determine which contacts 
endanger safety and privacy, courts may analogize to the long-
established tort and criminal law concepts of battery, assault, threats, 
trespass, and intrusion into seclusion. This constellation of misconduct 
lies at the core of civil harassment. Conduct resembling outrage 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress) lies at its periphery. Speech 
directed to listeners other than the victim (especially alleged defamation 
or malicious prosecution) falls outside the definition altogether. This 
focus on unwanted contact—rather than on the content of allegedly 
harassing speech—allows courts to apply civil harassment statutes in a 
better-defined, content neutral manner and to avoid content based 
injunctions that amount to unconstitutional prior restraints. 
Part IV offers concrete recommendations for judges applying existing 
statutes and for legislators considering new enactments or amendments. 
I.  Civil Harassment Orders in Theory and Practice 
Statutes containing the word “harassment” address a bewildering 
range of activity.25 This Article focuses on what I call civil harassment 
statutes: those allowing any person to obtain an injunction against any 
other person, regardless of their relationship, in response to behavior 
that causes feelings usually designated as harassment, annoyance, alarm, 
or emotional distress. The Statutory Appendix lists the twenty-three 
statutes fitting this description. 
 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
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This focus necessarily omits many statutes and legal doctrines that 
use the word “harassment” or similar terms that exist side-by-side with 
civil harassment statutes. Two of these are worth distinguishing at the 
outset because they are so well known. 
(1) Domestic Violence. Most domestic violence statutes authorize no-
contact orders between people within a statutorily defined relationship 
(such as marital, familial, cohabiting, or dating relationships). These 
statutes are distinguishable for two main reasons: First, civil harassment 
statutes and domestic violence statutes are designed to be complementary 
but non-overlapping statutory regimes. Most civil harassment statutes 
contain language ensuring that they do not apply within relationships 
covered by domestic violence statutes, channeling those matters into 
family court.26 Second, aggression can be both more likely and more 
dangerous within an intimate relationship. The dynamics of the 
relationship may increase batterers’ reliance on violence and intimidation 
as means of domination, while the fact of an intertwined life and its 
disparities of power may make it difficult for victims to extricate 
themselves from the situation.27 By contrast, civil harassment orders may 
be filed between any two people, whether or not their relationship is 
especially prone to violence or resistant to self-help. 
(2) Discriminatory Harassment. Many discrimination laws forbid 
unkind conduct selectively directed at members of disfavored groups. 
For example, some criminal statutes apply the label “harassment” to hate 
crime laws that penalize defendants who select a victim based on group 
membership.28 The most common use of the term “harassment” in 
discrimination law relates to employment. Title VII jurisprudence has 
adopted Catharine MacKinnon’s insight that some crassly sexualized 
behavior directed at women in the workplace should be viewed as sex 
discrimination.29 This theory came to be known as “sexual harassment,” a 
term that covers quid pro quo demands for sexual services and the 
creation of a hostile work environment.30 The concept of discriminatory 
harassment has been applied to other bases of discrimination (such as 
race31 or failure to comply with gender norms32) and to other factual 
 
 26. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.130 (2012). 
 27. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An 
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 552 (2007). 
 28. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 240.31 (McKinney 2008) (“Aggravated Harassment in the First 
Degree”); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080 (“Malicious Harassment”); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 850 (2012) 
(“Malicious Intimidation or Harassment”). 
 29. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986); see also Vicki Schultz, The 
Sanitized Workplace, 112 Yale L.J. 2061, 2076–87 (2003). 
 30. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752–54 (1998). 
 31. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry 
Co., 378 F.3d 790, 795–96 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 32. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (discrimination against masculine 
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settings (such as schools33). Some authors have suggested extending the 
concept to online speech by way of an analogy to discriminatory 
harassment in places of public accommodation.34 
Although both doctrines are legal responses to uncivil behavior, 
discriminatory harassment is a different animal than civil harassment. 
First, the goal of discrimination law is full societal participation by 
members of excluded groups. Discrimination statutes are not a “general 
civility code,”35 but civil harassment statutes basically are.36 In short, 
discriminatory harassment law asks why and to whom the defendant acts 
badly, questions that are largely irrelevant for civil harassment. Second, 
many discriminatory harassment laws apply in specific settings, like 
workplaces and schools, where captive audiences and hierarchical power 
dynamics lend themselves to discrimination and abuse of authority.37 
Civil harassment statutes apply across factual settings without regard to 
these features. Third, the predominant remedies for discriminatory 
harassment are criminal punishment and money damages, not injunctions. 
Some discrimination suits may seek injunctions against systemic 
discrimination, but this relief does not take the form of an individualized 
no-contact order. By contrast, no-contact orders are the primary (and 
often sole) remedy found in civil harassment statutes. 
Although discriminatory harassment is distinguishable from civil 
harassment, there is one important area of overlap: overzealous 
application of either doctrine may abridge freedom of speech. As such, this 
Article hopes to spark a dialogue similar to the debate that began in the 
early 1990s when scholars began to explore previously unacknowledged 
free speech implications of discriminatory harassment law.38 
 
woman); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (against feminine man). 
 33. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999) (failure to remedy 
student-on-student sexual harassment violates Title IX); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 
503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992) (failure to remedy teacher-on-student sexual harassment violates Title IX); 
Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to remedy 
student-on-student sexual orientation harassment violates Equal Protection). 
 34. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 Md. L. Rev. 
655 (2012). 
 35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII [is not] a 
general civility code.”); see Davis, 526 U.S. at 684 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same for Title IX); Lopez 
v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2012) (same for 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Boneck v. City of 
New Berlin, 22 F. App’x 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2001) (same for Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 36. This means that a supervisor who treats all employees terribly without regard to their group 
membership (the “equal opportunity harasser”) is not liable for discriminatory harassment but may be 
liable for civil harassment. See Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding 
no liability for discriminatory harassment); Williams v. Aona, 210 P.3d 501, 515 (Haw. 2009) (finding 
possible liability for civil harassment). 
 37. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (school); Aguilar 
v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 870 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (workplace). 
 38. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious 
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A. The Evolution and Structure of Civil Harassment Statutes 
In medieval England, a person who made threats could be ordered 
to post a “surety of the peace,” a sum to be held in escrow and subject to 
forfeiture in the event of future violence. In the United States, the 
concept remained on the books into the twentieth century, but it was 
seldom used and is now entirely obsolete.39 Until the late 1970s, the 
primary legal responses to what we today call harassment were criminal 
punishment and tort damages.40 The advent of domestic violence 
restraining orders—which combined elements of pre-existing criminal 
and tort laws with the enforceability of an injunction—gave rise to 
modern civil harassment statutes. 
1.  Criminal Harassment Statutes 
Many states have criminal statutes forbidding activities called 
“harassment.” This Article does not address the propriety or 
constitutionality of criminal harassment laws.41 However, opinions 
interpreting criminal harassment statutes can be persuasive authority for 
civil harassment statutes containing similar language. In addition, some 
civil harassment statutes incorporate by reference the definitions found 
in criminal harassment laws.42 
 
Employee, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 577, 631 n.355 (1997) (collecting authorities). See generally 
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Nadine Strossen, 
Regulating Workplace Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment—Avoiding a Collision, 
37 Vill. L. Rev. 757 (1992); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace 
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791 (1992).  
 39. See Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 819, 868–75 (1993). 
 40. Some state courts have granted analogous injunctions as remedies in cases alleging other civil 
claims. See, e.g., Lassalle v. Daniels, 673 So. 2d 704, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1996). New York’s experience 
shows how this approach can be unpredictable. In an influential opinion, a federal court applying New 
York law issued a no-contact order against an intrusive paparazzo who had been stalking Jacqueline 
Kennedy Onassis, reasoning that the state’s criminal harassment law implied a private cause of action. 
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2d Cir. 1973). Later state cases repudiated that interpretation of 
the statute. See New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Cain, 418 F. Supp. 2d 457, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (collecting 
cases). Nonetheless, New York courts occasionally rely on common law theories like outrage or 
invasion of privacy to issue injunctions on harassment-type facts. See, e.g., Flamm v. Van Nierop, 291 
N.Y.S.2d 189, 190–91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992). These injunctions have included orders against demonstrators. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network 
of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997); Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172, 173–75 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 41. Some of these statutes are discussed in Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many 
Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyber-Stalking” (2012) [hereinafter Volokh, One-to-One], 
available at http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/30/one-to-one-speech-vs-one-to-many-speech-criminal-
harassment-laws-and-cyber-stalking. 
 42. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1503(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2012) (incorporating 
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2012)); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2950a (2012) 
(incorporating Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411h (1998)). 
April 2013]      CIVIL HARASSMENT ORDERS 791 
 
The words “harass” and “harassment” appear in some older statutes, 
but for our purposes we may begin with the American Law Institute’s 
publication of the Model Penal Code in 1961. The American Law Institute 
proposed that states enact a misdemeanor titled “Harassment” to cover a 
hodgepodge of misconduct: 
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass 
another, he: 
(1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate 
communication; or 
(2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke 
violent or disorderly response; or 
(3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely 
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or 
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or 
(5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no 
legitimate purpose of the actor.43 
Most states now have statutes criminalizing one or more of the five types 
of harassment described in the Model Penal Code. 
The drafters conceptualized harassment as a privatized form of 
disorderly conduct: “The instant section applies to harassment of another 
individual, while the crime of disorderly conduct covers the public-
nuisance aspects of comparable behavior.”44 The residual provision in 
subsection (5)—“any other course of alarming [but unspecified] 
conduct”—was proposed “as a hedge against the ingenuity of human 
beings in finding ways to bedevil their fellows.”45 It was worded “in a 
designedly general way” to further “its purpose to proscribe forms of 
harassment that cannot be anticipated and precisely stated in advance.”46 
Examples of conduct intended to be proscribed by the section were 
“burning a cross on the lawn of a black family,” “leaving animal carcasses 
on a neighbor’s stoop,” and “shining a spotlight into a parked car in order 
to embarrass or frighten the occupants.”47 
Although the drafters expressed no concern over the meaning of 
“harass” in the phrase “with purpose to harass another,” they 
 
 43. Model Penal Code § 250.4 (1980). 
 44. Id. § 250.4 cmt. i. The Model Penal Code defines disorderly conduct as follows:  
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with purpose to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (a) engages in fighting or 
threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or (b) makes unreasonable noise or 
offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses abusive language to any person 
present; or (c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves 
no legitimate purpose of the actor.  
Id. § 250.2(1). 
 45. Id. § 250.4 cmt. 5 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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acknowledged that other terms—such as “no legitimate purpose”—invite 
“judicial exploration” because they are “hardly self-executing” and might 
even be found unconstitutionally vague.48 Despite this imprecision, the 
drafters concluded,  
[I]t is probably impossible to do any better. There is no realistic 
prospect of anticipating in a series of more specific provisions all the 
ways that persons may devise to harass others, and without a residual 
offense of this sort, many illegitimate and plainly reprehensible forms 
of harassment would not be covered.49  
This value judgment—that it is better to enact a broader, vaguer law than 
to allow unforeseen bad actions to go unremedied—reappears in modern 
civil harassment statutes. 
2.  Domestic Violence Restraining Order Statutes 
If criminal harassment is a substantive precursor to civil harassment 
statutes, domestic violence injunctions are their procedural ancestors. 
Domestic violence statutes allow a partner in an intimate relationship to 
obtain, upon proof of violence or threats, an injunction against further 
contact from the abusive partner.50 The procedural innovation of the 
domestic violence injunction arose from the emerging understanding in 
the 1970s and 1980s of domestic violence as an escalating and ongoing 
process of subordination, rather than as a discrete criminal event. By 
intervening civilly at an early stage of the process, escalation might be 
prevented altogether if the aggressor obeys the injunction. If it is not 
obeyed, violations are more easily punished because they do not face the 
proof problems of an ordinary criminal prosecution. Just as it was easier 
to prosecute Al Capone for tax evasion than for murder, it can be easier 
to prosecute an aggressor for violating a no-contact order than for a 
crime of violence. A paper trail proves that the injunction was issued and 
served, and the fact of post-injunction contact will involve fewer and 
simpler credibility questions. The result is a short and relatively easy trial, 
made even easier because the propriety of the underlying order cannot be 
questioned due to the collateral bar rule and because a jury is likely to 
treat the fact of an order as character evidence against the accused. 
Obtaining the no-contact order at the front end is also easier than 
obtaining a criminal conviction. The most important difference is the 
burden of proof, which requires only a preponderance of the evidence 
instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Next, victims may initiate their 
own actions, avoiding the potential bottleneck of an unsympathetic or 
overworked prosecutor. The domestic violence injunction statutes of all 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 250.4 cmt. 6. 
 50. See generally Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of Domestic 
Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 31 (2009). 
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states have procedures to facilitate self-help and access to justice, including 
waivers of court fees, pre-printed petition forms, rapidly scheduled 
hearings, regularized temporary restraining order provisions, and so on. 
Finally, the injunction decision is made by a judge rather than a jury. This 
matters not because juries will necessarily issue fewer or different orders 
than would a judge (an unknowable empirical question), but because 
empanelling a jury is slow and expensive. Judges sitting without juries can 
resolve cases more quickly, allowing more petitions to be processed. 
Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt a modern domestic 
violence injunction statute in 1976, and all other states quickly followed 
suit.51 Criminal law52 and tort law53 remain important aspects of the legal 
response to domestic violence, but the judicially issued no-contact order 
is “the single most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence.”54 
3.  Stalking Statutes 
A concern arose in the early 1980s that then-existing laws would not 
reach dangerously obsessed people, such as the deranged fan of a 
celebrity or the former (or would-be) intimate who insists on continued 
contact with a victim in hopes of renewing (or initiating) the relationship, 
exacting revenge, or exerting continued control.55 Six murders in the late 
1980s—television actress Rebecca Shaeffer was murdered by an obsessed 
fan, and five women in Orange County were murdered by their former 
spouses or boyfriends—led California to enact the first stalking law in 
1990, which allowed criminal prosecution of anyone who “willfully, 
maliciously, and repeatedly follows . . . another person and who makes a 
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for 
his or her safety.”56 
The California legislature chose to make stalking a crime, a decision 
that reflected two concerns. First, truly obsessional people would not be 
 
 51. Janice L. Grau, Comment, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A 
Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. Rev. 703, 704–05 (1982). The National Network to End Domestic Violence 
has an excellent online resource to locate domestic violence laws. See WomensLaw.org, Legal 
Statutes, http://www.womenslaw.org/simple.php?sitemap_id=9 (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 52. For variations on traditional criminal prosecution in domestic violence cases, see Burke, supra 
note 27, at 555; C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice 
Processes to Promote Acceptance of Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 Harv. J.L. 
& Gender 311, 330–35 (2012). 
 53. See generally Martha Chamallas & Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, 
Gender, and Tort Law (2010); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 121 
(2001). 
 54. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help 
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1487, 1489 (2008). 
 55. See generally A.J.R., Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 Va. L. Rev. 507 (1984). 
The psychology of stalking is summarized in McAnaney et al., supra note 39, at 831–42; Paul E. Mullen 
& Michele Pathé, Stalking, 29 Crime & Just. 273, 274 (2002). 
 56. Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a) (2012). 
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deterred by an injunction. Indeed, several of the Orange County victims 
had obtained domestic violence injunctions or civil harassment orders 
against their killers. Second, the unwanted contact was viewed not only as 
a warning sign of future violent crime, but as a crime itself. The repeated 
unwanted visits, phone calls, or letters caused their own, separately 
cognizable legal harms.57 At the urging of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
all fifty states and the federal government enacted criminal stalking 
statutes within three years.58 
4.  Civil Harassment Statutes 
Civil harassment statutes are designed in part to deal with stalking 
(following or surveillance that causes fear for one’s safety), but they 
reach further because the usual definition of harassment extends to 
unspecified conduct that causes emotional distress other than fear for 
one’s safety. The two ideas inevitably overlap: Many statutes include 
stalking-type language in their definitions of harassment, or vice versa.59 
Civil harassment statutes expand beyond the blueprint of domestic 
violence injunctions in two ways. One expansion involves the persons 
covered by the statutes. In response to concerns that intimidation and 
unwanted contact may arise even between non-intimates,60 these statutes 
eliminate any relationship requirement. Today, common pairings in civil 
harassment cases include disputes involving a person’s current spouse/ 
boyfriend/girlfriend against a former spouse/boyfriend/girlfriend, parents 
against their children’s boyfriends/girlfriends, neighbor against neighbor, 
co-worker against co-worker, tenant against landlord, and miscellaneous 
acquaintances against each other.61 The other expansion involves the 
conduct covered by the statutes. Domestic violence statutes authorize 
injunctions upon a showing of violence or threats, but that standard fails 
to capture lower-level aggression that can form an overall package of 
 
 57. See McAnaney et al., supra note 39, at 882–83. 
 58. Anna-Rose Mathieson, Every Move You Make: How Stories Shape the Law of Stalking, 
101 Mich. L. Rev. 1589, 1594 (2003). Many states also authorize civil injunctions against stalking. A 
number of law review articles addressed stalking statutes shortly after this wave of adoptions. See, e.g., 
McAnaney et al., supra note 39; M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment, Are Stalking Laws 
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769 (1994); Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The 
Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 991 (1993); Suzanne L. Karbarz, Note, 
The First Amendment Implications of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 21 J. Legis. 333 (1995); Kimberly A. 
Tolhurst, Comment, A Search for Solutions: Evaluating the Latest Anti-Stalking Developments and the 
National Institute of Justice Model Stalking Code, 1 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 269 (1994).  
 59. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(b)(1) (West 2012) (stalking appears in definition of 
harassment), with Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1 (2012) (harassment appears in definition of stalking). Hawaii 
has a crime called “Harassment by Stalking,” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.5 (2009), while 
Massachusetts has a crime known as “Stalking by Harassment,” Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 
575, 577–78 (Mass. 1999) (describing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43). 
 60. Grau, supra note 51, at 726. 
 61. Dunlap, supra note 21, at 4; Tommasino, supra note 21, at 66–74. 
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control, domination, or intimidation. Following the lead of the residual 
harassment offense in the Model Penal Code, states began enacting 
statutes that refrained from specifying any particular conduct by the 
harasser. 
California enacted the first civil harassment statute in 1978. The 
statute currently provides that “a person who has suffered harassment,” 
no matter from whom, may obtain an injunction upon proof of “a 
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that 
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no 
legitimate purpose.”62 I will call this four-part definition—(1) a course of 
conduct; (2) directed at a victim; (3) resulting in harassment; (4) without 
legitimate purpose—“the California model.” The central drafting choice 
behind the California model is to avoid describing the acts that may 
constitute harassment. They are identified only by reference to their 
emotional effect on the victim, which in turn is only lightly specified as a 
form of low-level emotional distress. 
Twenty-two other states enacted civil harassment statutes between 
1984 and 2004, most of them following the California model.63 The less 
precise variations are sparse or even circular. Some states replace 
“alarms, annoys, or harasses” with other formulas such as “harass[es] or 
intimidate[s]” (Wisconsin),64 “alarms or causes distress” (Missouri),65 
“seriously alarms or disturbs consistently or continually bothers” 
(Hawaii),66 or “seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to 
such person” (Washington).67 In Wyoming, an order may issue if, “with 
intent to harass another person, the person engages in a course of 
conduct reasonably likely to harass that person, including but not limited 
to . . . [c]ommunicating . . . in a manner that harasses; . . . [or] engaging in 
a course of conduct that harasses another person.”68 
Statutes constructed around the California model often include some 
combination of additional elements. Some list specific acts that per se 
constitute harassment, such as threats of violence, following, or repeated 
phone calls at inconvenient times.69 Most require that the course of 
conduct actually cause emotional distress for the petitioner (a subjective 
 
 62. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6. 
 63. See infra Statutory Appendix. 
 64. Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b) (2011). 
 65. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.010(1)(d) (2012). 
 66. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 604-10.5(a) (2009). 
 67. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.020(2) (2012). 
 68. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) (2012) (defining the violation); id. § 7-3-507 (authorizing 
injunction). 
 69. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(b)(1) (West 2012) (harassing course of conduct includes 
“following or stalking” and “making harassing telephone calls”); Minn. Stat. § 609.748(a)(1) (West 
2009) (civil harassment includes “physical or sexual assault”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.591 (2011) 
(incorporating § 200.571(1)(a)(1) (2012)) (harassment includes making threats). 
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standard), could cause emotional distress for a reasonable person (an 
objective standard), or both.70 Many have some variation of an intent 
requirement, whether it be a specific intent to harass,71 intentional or 
knowing conduct,72 or absence of legitimate purpose.73 Many have 
constitutional savings clauses providing that protected speech or activity 
should not be considered part of a harassing course of conduct, or that 
orders should be written to avoid abridging freedom of speech.74 While 
serving as useful reminders to trial courts, savings clauses cannot by 
themselves salvage an otherwise unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 
statute.75 
The remedies authorized by the statutes are typically open-ended, 
allowing courts wide latitude to “enjoin the harassment,” no matter what 
form that might take.76 Most specify some content that is preferred for 
the orders, such as a requirement to stay a certain distance away from the 
petitioner, not to communicate with the petitioner directly or through 
third parties, and not to keep the petitioner under surveillance.77 Once an 
order is issued, most states require the court to forward the order to a 
statewide database accessible by law enforcement.78 Violations may be 
punished as contempt of court, as a separate crime, or both.79 
B. Civil Harassment Litigation in Practice 
 1.  The Volume of Civil Harassment Litigation 
No single reliable source tracks the total number of civil harassment 
petitions in the United States. While imperfect, the available measures 
indicate that the volume of civil harassment litigation is large. Five states 
compile judicial statistics that separately enumerate civil harassment 
petitions, as listed below in Table 1. If the five-state rate of 156 civil 
 
 70. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1(6) (2009) (subjective); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(A) (2011) 
(objective); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.020(2) (both). 
 71. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(a)(ii); Cates v. Donahue, 916 A.2d 941, 944 (Me. 2007). 
 72. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-31a02 (2012); Bailey v. Sanchez, 990 P.2d 1194, 1199–200 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1999). 
 73. Washington’s statute is unique in providing a nonexclusive list of factors for a court to consider 
when deciding whether the respondent acted with legitimate purpose. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.030. 
 74. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(b)(1).; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 10.14.020(1), 10.14.080(7), 
10.14.190. Arizona eliminated its savings clause in 1996, but even without it, state courts interpret the 
statute not to reach “pure political speech.” LaFaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56, 62 (2002). 
 75. State v. Pierce, 887 A.2d 132, 135 (N.H. 2005) (criminal harassment); Long v. State, 
931 S.W.2d 285, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (same). 
 76. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1809 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.080(3). 
 77. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(b)(6); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.080(6).  
 78. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(q)(3); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.110.  
 79. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.120 (contempt); id. § 10.14.170 (separate crime); LeMay v. 
Leander, 994 P.2d 546, 554–55 (Haw. 2000) (contempt); State v. Inman, 216 P.3d 121, 122–23 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 2009) (separate crime).  
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harassment petitions per 100,000 population held true across the twenty-
three states with civil harassment statutes (which have a total population 
of approximately 140.6 million), there would be approximately 219,700 
petitions filed annually.  
 
Table 1: Civil Harassment Petitions Filed in 2011 
for States with Available Statistics 
Jurisdiction Civil Harassment  
Petitions Filed  
(per 100,000 population)
Domestic Violence  
Petitions Filed 
(per 100,000 population) 
Minnesota80 
(pop. 5,303,925) 
9918 
(187)
10,965 
(207)
Nevada81 
(pop. 2,700,551) 
4931 
(183)
11,583 
(429)
South Dakota82 
(pop. 814,180) 
1952 
(240)
2508 
(308)
Utah83 
(pop. 2,763,885) 
777 
(28)
4902 
(177)
Washington84 
(pop. 6,724,540) 
11,027 
(168)
18,666 
(278)
Five-state total 
(pop. 18,307,081) 
23,674 
(156)
37,041 
(266)
 
When granted, civil harassment orders are to be conveyed to state 
law enforcement databases. Few of these databases distinguish no-
contact orders that result from criminal sentences, conditions of bail, 
domestic violence orders, or civil harassment orders, but fortunately the 
Washington State Patrol database does. As of July 2012, it contained 
15,802 currently enforceable civil harassment orders (613 temporary and 
15,189 final).85 If the other states with civil harassment statutes had a 
similar per capita volume of currently enforceable orders, there would be 
approximately 330,000 temporary or final civil harassment orders in 
effect at any one time. 
 
 80. Minn. Judicial Branch, Annual Report to the Community 18 (2011). All population 
figures are taken from the U.S. census for 2010. See Census Data, Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census 
Bureau (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/2010census. 
 81. Nev. Judiciary, Annual Report 42–45 tbl. A7 (2011), available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/ 
index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/AOC-Files/Research-and-Statistics-Unit/2011-Annual-Report-of-
the-Nevada-Judiciary. Table 1 combines the volumes of the District Courts and Justice Courts. 
 82. S.D. Unified Judicial Sys., Report, at 10 tbl.B-7 (2011). 
 83. Utah District Courts: FY 2011 Case Type by Court, Utah State Courts, http:// 
www.utcourts.gov/stats/files/2011FY/district/0-Statewide.pdf. 
 84. Caseloads of the Courts of Washington, Wash. Courts, http://www.courts.wa.gov/caseload. 
Table 1 combines the volumes of the Superior Courts and courts of limited jurisdiction. 
 85. Response to author’s Public Records Act request (on file with author). 
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State-level statistics do not indicate the percentage of filed petitions 
that are granted, but the numbers from Washington suggest that a 
petition is far more likely to be granted than denied. Assuming that most 
but not all orders will expire after the default duration of one year,86 it 
would require a relatively high grant rate for approximately 11,000 
annual petitions to result in 15,000 currently enforceable orders. The 
level of success for petitioners results in part from structural features of 
civil harassment litigation that encourage the issuance of orders, even at 
the risk of constitutional error. 
 2.  Procedural Features That Invite Constitutional Error 
a. Pro Se Litigants 
Overwhelmingly, the parties in civil harassment litigation represent 
themselves.87 In one Missouri courtroom, 91% of the petitioners were pro 
se, as were 85% of respondents.88 The overwhelming amount of self-
representation is by design, drawing from the model of domestic violence 
injunction statutes. Most civil harassment statutes include provisions to 
assist indigent or unrepresented parties, including fee waivers and pre-
printed petition forms.89 Court access for the unrepresented is laudable, 
but it means that judges are deprived of their most commonly relied-upon 
source for identifying the controlling law: the briefing and arguments of 
counsel. 
When describing respondent’s conduct, pro se petitioners tend to 
emphasize what they find most bothersome, even if it is constitutionally 
protected or exceeds a court’s power to remedy. For example, many 
petitioners in Las Vegas ask the court to impose prior restraints on 
respondents’ speech to third parties. Among their requested forms of 
relief: 
 “Refrain from badmouthing me and my family.” 
 “Stay away from any online groups or websites that I may be a part of.” 
 “Never use my name, verbally or written.” 
 “Stop talking about me.” 
 
 86. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.080(4)–(5) (2012). Washington courts have discretion to enter 
longer orders and to renew orders that are scheduled to expire. 
 87. See Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t is well known 
that, in reality, few people appearing at hearings on civil harassment petitions are represented by 
counsel.”); Tommasino, supra note 21, at 344. 
 88. Dunlap, supra note 21, at 5. 
 89. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(v)(1) (West 2012) (“The Judicial Council shall develop 
forms instructions, and rules relating to matters governed by this section. The petition and response 
forms shall be simple and concise, and their use by parties in actions brought pursuant to this section 
shall be mandatory.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748(3)(a) (West 2009) (“The court shall provide 
simplified forms and clerical assistance to help with the writing and filing of a petition under this 
section and shall advise the petitioner of the right to sue in forma pauperis.”). 
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 “I want the Court to prohibit [respondent] from all Internet access.”90 
For their part, unrepresented respondents may not be able to recognize 
legally improper allegations or requests for impermissible relief and, as a 
result, fail to assert potentially winning statutory or constitutional 
objections. The predominance of unrepresented litigants threatens a 
breakdown of the adversarial process.91 This is even more evident when 
courts rule on ex parte requests for temporary orders, which most 
statutes authorize courts to issue based solely on a petitioner’s affidavit.92 
b. Little Appellate Oversight 
Harassment orders, when granted, are very rarely appealed. In the 
Justice Courts of Las Vegas in 2008, only three out of 2034 non-domestic 
violence petitions resulted in an appeal.93 No appellate court opinions 
interpret the Nevada statute—even though it was enacted in 1989. As a 
result, “the limited jurisdiction courts [of Nevada] have been operating in 
a vacuum and creating ad hoc, reactive solutions” to recurring 
problems.94 The complete absence of appeals in Nevada is extreme, but 
other states also have few appellate decisions compared to the volume of 
petitions filed and orders granted. In South Dakota, for example, 8092 
civil harassment petitions were filed from 2008–2011, but since the statute’s 
enactment in 1997 only seven petitions have led to reported appellate 
opinions.95 
A number of factors contribute to the dearth of appeals. First and 
most important is that the parties are pro se. However daunting it may be 
for an untrained person to litigate in a local trial court, it will be more 
difficult to write an appellate brief describing a trial court’s legal errors. 
Unlike the trial court, the court of appeals has no local clerk’s window 
that distributes pre-printed forms. Second, because temporary orders last 
 
 90. Tommasino, supra note 21, at 98–99. 
 91. John C. Sheldon, Thinking Outside of the Box About Pro Se Litigation, 23 Me. B.J. 90, 91 
(2008) (“[T]he adversarial method of resolving disputes . . . assumes that parties know the law, are 
adept at procedure and the rules of evidence, and can marshal significant facts, present their side of 
the case to the factfinder thoroughly and lance the arguments of the opponent. But pro se litigants are 
capable of little if any of that.”). 
 92. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.085(1) (2012). 
 93. Tommasino, supra note 21, at 52 n.144. By contrast, approximately 15% of federal trial court 
decisions are appealed. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 
85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 681, 702 (2007). 
 94. Tommasino, supra note 21, at 55. 
 95. Of these, two affirmed the grant of an order, White v. Bain, 752 N.W.2d 203 (S.D. 2008); 
Schaefer ex rel. S.S. v. Liechti, 711 N.W.2d 257 (S.D. 2006), one reversed an order on the merits, Shore 
v. Cruz, 667 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 2003), three reversed and remanded due to procedural irregularities, 
March v. Thursby, 806 N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 2011); Judstra v. Donelan, 712 N.W.2d 866 (S.D. 2006); 
Goeden v. Daum, 668 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 2003), and one affirmed the denial of a motion to modify an 
unappealed order, Sjomeling v. Stuber, 615 N.W.2d 613 (S.D. 2000). None involved an appeal of a 
denied petition. 
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only weeks and final orders typically expire in a year or two, appeals of 
granted orders often become moot.96 Third, many respondents may feel 
that the stakes are too low to justify the effort of appeal. It may on balance 
be easier to obey the order than to deal with more judicial proceedings. 
Fourth, disappointed petitioners almost never appeal. Fifth, parties 
represented by counsel will likely be advised against appealing, given a 
standard of review that one state describes as “extreme deference.”97 
The lack of appeals contributes to trial court error in two independent 
ways. First, trial courts in some states have no guiding precedent, including 
any definitive narrowing or clarifying constructions for broadly worded 
statutes. Second, like everyone else, judges are on their best behavior 
when they know they are being watched.98 Hence, even in states with some 
published civil harassment opinions from appellate courts, trial courts may 
more easily deviate from those opinions if they believe their rulings will 
not be reviewed. Some trial judges may take extra care with decisions 
unlikely to be appealed, knowing that they are the court of last resort. As 
described below, however, this laudable approach is not universal. 
c. Expedited Procedures 
Drawing on the domestic violence injunction model, the procedures 
for civil harassment petitions emphasize court access and speed. These 
are important virtues, but they may inadvertently dampen a court’s 
ability to recognize and navigate constitutional questions. 
Petitioners may file in an easily accessible local court of limited 
jurisdiction, such as a municipal court, magistrate court, or justice of the 
peace court. Judges in such courts tend to have little experience with free 
speech questions, given their usual docket of traffic infractions, small 
claims, collections, and the like. In some states, courts of limited 
jurisdiction may be presided over by part-time judges or lay judges 
without law degrees.99 Civil harassment statutes routinely provide for ex 
parte temporary orders within days of filing. Thereafter, the cases 
proceed on a rocket docket that sets a hearing on a final order within a 
few weeks. There is no mechanism for pre-hearing discovery. The 
proceedings are far less formal than an ordinary civil trial. They tend to 
more closely resemble small claims court: The customary rules of evidence 
do not apply, hearsay is tolerated, and there is no jury. The Constitution 
does not require civil harassment petitions to be resolved with the 
formality of a criminal trial, so expedited procedures have repeatedly 
 
 96. See, e.g., J.S. v. D.C., 368 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Towner v. Ridgway, 272 P.3d 
765 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
 97. Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 752 N.W.2d 359, 370 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
 98. Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind 256 (2012) (“You don’t need a social scientist to tell 
you that people behave less ethically when they think nobody can see them.”). 
 99. See Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1569, 1573 (2007). 
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been upheld against procedural due process challenges.100 Nonetheless, 
the informality may lead to prejudice when parties have little time to 
make their case and judges have little time to reflect. 
Procedural irregularities were on full display in Gullickson v. 
Kline.101 The petitioner Jody Gullickson, the mayor of a small North 
Dakota town, sought an order against resident John Kline because he 
allegedly disrupted a city council meeting by “by asking questions, 
requesting copies of ordinances, telling council members they should 
resign so more qualified people could serve, making a racially insensitive 
remark, and staring at Gullickson with ‘little beady eyes.’”102 Gullickson’s 
testimony consisted of the trial court asking her if the contents of her 
affidavit were true, and she answered that they were. She then said that 
in addition to what she described in her affidavit, her husband and 
mother had told her that Kline had mistreated them. Kline was not 
allowed to cross-examine Gullickson regarding her affidavit, and his 
hearsay objection to the out-of-court statements of others was overruled. 
Kline argued in part that his behavior, if proven, was constitutionally 
protected, but the trial court never ruled on the free speech objection. 
When Kline began to testify in his defense, the trial judge cut him off: 
THE COURT: Excuse me. Mr. McCabe [counsel for Kline], I don’t 
have an infinite amount of time for this hearing, so what I’m going to 
do is allow you to just tell me in the form of an offer of proof what the 
rest of any evidence you’re going to present is, cause I’ve got lots of 
other business on my calendar here . . . .103 
The court did not allow Kline’s wife to testify or Kline’s attorney to 
make closing argument. When counsel asked if could “just get a one last 
ten second thing for the record,” the trial judge responded, “No, we’re 
done.”104 At the end of this rapid-fire proceeding, the court signed a fill-
in-the-blank order barring Kline from approaching within one hundred 
yards of Gullickson for two years, making it effectively impossible for 
him to visit City Hall or attend City Council meetings.105 
 
 100. See Mahmood v. Mahmud, 778 N.W.2d 426, 432 n.14 (Neb. 2010) (collecting cases); Skadberg 
v. Skadberg, 644 N.W.2d 873, 876 (N.D. 2002) (direct testimony may be replaced by affidavits); 
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 996 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (same for domestic violence statute 
with analogous procedures); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1987) (civil 
harassment procedures do not violate due process). 
 101. 678 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 2004). 
 102. Id. at 139. 
 103. Id. at 142. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Procedural shortcuts requiring reversal occurred in Mahmood, where the petition was granted 
solely on petitioner’s hearsay application with no sworn testimony taken from respondent. 778 N.W.2d 
at 432 (“[T]he proceedings were so informal that we have been left with no evidence at all.”). See 
Devereaux v. Rodriguez, No. G038462, 2008 WL 2756476, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 16, 2008) (“[T]he 
trial court admitted it had not reviewed the [written submissions], it limited the testimony of the 
parties (often interrupting them) . . . and it refused to entertain any discussion or argument about the 
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Across the border in South Dakota, some trial courts hear sharply 
conflicting testimony but make no findings of fact or express credibility 
determinations. The only record generated from the hearings is an order, 
typically consisting of a preprinted form with boxes checked. The South 
Dakota Supreme Court has remanded some such decisions with 
instructions to make findings, noting that it cannot meaningfully review the 
judgments without them. The message is not sticking: Such decisions were 
issued in 2003 and 2006, yet the same problem still required correction in 
2011.106 
A procedural shortcut found in many courts could be called the non-
order order. In these situations, the trial court finds no liability and 
refrains from entering an enforceable order, but warns the respondent to 
knock it off, implying that legal consequences would follow in the event 
of a violation. One example is Judstra v. Donelan,107 a South Dakota 
dispute between a homeowner and a contractor. Both parties testified at 
the hearing on the homeowner’s petition. The court made no factual 
findings or credibility determinations and denied the petition, but orally 
warned the contractor to behave himself. A few days later, the 
homeowner filed a new petition, alleging that the contractor “sneered” at 
her while exiting the courthouse after the first hearing.108 At a second 
hearing, the judge exhibited anger from the bench over what he perceived 
to be a violation of his non-order order: 
THE COURT: . . . . I just heard this case not too long ago, and I 
dismissed the Protection Order, and I told Mr. Donelan, you stay away 
from her, don’t go near her, don’t go near her, don’t go near her. . . . 
. . . . I dismissed it, and I’m making a finding that first of all, I warned 
him. I said you stay away from her, you do not go near her, you leave 
her alone, and I bet I said it ten times if I said it once, and she waited in 
the courtroom to give him a chance to leave the building, then she goes 
down and he specifically walks up to her and sneers at her and makes a 
face. That violated the Order that I gave him to get out of the 
courthouse, before he was even out of the courthouse, and I am 
granting a protection order for Ms. Judstra for three years against 
 
underlying harassment allegations.”); Nora v. Kaddo, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(court refused to hear non-party witnesses); Hutchinson v. Boyle, 753 N.W.2d 881, 882 (N.D. 2008) 
(trial court failed to rule on free speech defense); Cusey v. Nagel, 695 N.W.2d 697, 703 (N.D. 2005) 
(petitioner not allowed to testify); Drake v. Drake, No. 03A01-9610-CV-00312, 1997 WL 198776 
(Tenn. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (same). 
 106. See March v. Thursby, 806 N.W.2d 239, 244 (S.D. 2011); Judstra v. Donelan, 712 N.W.2d 866 
(S.D. 2006); Goeden v. Daum, 668 N.W.2d 108, 110 (S.D. 2003). The Court criticized the lack of 
findings in Shore v. Cruz, 667 N.W.2d 312, 315 (S.D. 2003), but found enough in the record to reverse 
without a remand. The problem is not limited to South Dakota. See Edelen v. Bonamarte, 162 P.3d 
847 (Mont. 2007); Towner v. Ridgway, 182 P.3d 347, 351 (Utah 2008). 
 107. 712 N.W.2d 866 (S.D. 2006). 
 108.  Id. at 867. 
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Mr. Donelan for stalking and for not even obeying my Order long 
enough to get out of the courthouse . . . .109 
In a creative variation on the non-order order, some Las Vegas 
judges intentionally keep cases open without a decision as a method of 
controlling the parties without entering a final judgment.110 Among other 
problems, this approach denies worthy petitioners the enforceability of 
an order recorded in a law enforcement database and denies worthy 
respondents the ability to appeal. 
d. Underestimation of Collateral Consequences 
Some judges may believe that a civil harassment order imposes no 
serious hardship: The petitioner wants to be left alone, it will be easy for 
the respondent to leave the petitioner alone, and so an order imposes 
little cost on anyone.111 Take, for example, a petition filed by a seemingly 
delusional resident of Santa Fe, New Mexico, against New York-based 
talk show host David Letterman. The petition alleged that Letterman 
inflicted mental cruelty by thinking about the petitioner and using coded 
communications on his program that secretly referred to her. After 
reviewing the petition ex parte, a judge set the matter for a hearing and 
entered a standard form temporary order directing Letterman not to 
threaten, harm, alarm, or annoy the petitioner, not to approach within 
100 yards, not to contact her by telephone or otherwise, and not to block 
her in public places or on roads.112 Letterman would probably be quite 
happy to comply, since it appears that little good would come from 
contacting this particular petitioner. But there is more to an injunction 
than its terms; significant collateral consequences also attach upon the 
entry of a civil harassment order.113 Here is a partial listing: 
Barred access to people and places near the petitioner. To stay a fixed 
distance from a petitioner also requires staying away from anything else 
within that zone. Some civil harassment orders can make it unlawful for 
 
 109. Id. at 868. 
 110. See Tommasino, supra note 21, at 64–65. 
 111. This dynamic can be seen in Devereaux v. Rodriguez, No. G038462, 2008 WL 2756476, at *4 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 16, 2008): “The [trial] court did not inquire about the allegations asserted in the 
petition . . . [Instead] it asked Rodriguez if there was any reason why she should have anything to do 
with Devereaux. Rodriguez replied, ‘Absolutely not.’ The court inquired, ‘Then why don’t we just 
agree that you won’t?’” and granted the petition. See Dunlap, supra note 21, at 5 (“[J]udges readily 
afford protection to anyone, upon no further showing than a desire to be spared the company of 
designated others.”). 
 112. See Eugene Volokh, Is This Some Solstice Fool’s Joke?, The Volokh Conspiracy (Dec. 21, 
2005, 1:30 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1135193403.shtml. The order was later vacated. 
 113. Collateral consequences of criminal convictions are discussed in Natapoff, supra note 24; 
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and 
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457 (2010); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and 
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 670 (2008). 
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people to remain in their own homes,114 attend their own schools,115 report 
to their own jobs,116 or visit their own children.117 Sometimes these results 
are not collateral consequences, but intended ones: Some petitions are 
used by parents to evade family court procedures for modifying child 
custody arrangements, or by landlords as a faster and easier alternative 
to eviction.118 
Firearms restrictions. Under the Brady Bill, persons subject to 
certain civil harassment orders are prohibited from owning firearms.119 
This can affect not only firearms enthusiasts and hunters, but also the 
career options of police officers, service members, or others who are 
required to handle guns at work.120 
Background checks. Like any civil judgment, a harassment order is 
placed into a publicly available court file, where it is available to credit 
reporting agencies and other data brokers. An adverse judgment can be 
harmful to one’s credit, and it can also show up in background checks 
routinely performed by prospective employers and landlords. No current 
antidiscrimination law would bar an employer or landlord from taking 
adverse action against a person on the basis of a civil harassment order. 
Hence, some courts have acknowledged that the entry of a civil 
harassment order (like a criminal conviction) can be stigmatizing.121 
Future legal consequences. A civil harassment order creates a new 
crime that can only be committed by the respondent. Actions that would 
otherwise be lawful—such as attending a school sporting event or placing 
a telephone call—become potentially criminal. Even if no criminal 
prosecution follows, other less extreme but nonetheless perilous legal 
consequences exist. The issuance of a past harassment order can be a 
 
 114. See, e.g., Trummel v. Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). 
 115. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.040(7) (2012). 
 116. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat tit. 5 § 4655(1)(C-1)(2) (2011). 
 117. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.080(4). 
 118. See Dunlap, supra note 21, at 4 (some petitions seek to circumvent custody procedures), 122 
(eviction procedures); Tommasino, supra note 21, at 58 (eviction procedures); see also Mettling v. 
Hutchison, No. 30139-7-III, 2012 WL 3629049 (Wash. App. Aug. 23, 2012) (civil harassment order 
issued on facts amounting to common law nuisance). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012). See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 2011). The federal firearms ban is a collateral 
consequence of any order, civil or criminal, that “restrains [defendant] from harassing, stalking, or 
threatening an intimate partner” and includes findings relating to use of force. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). 
The statute is not triggered by a bare “no contact” order that does not recite the necessary findings, 
United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011), but depending upon its wording a civil 
harassment order may suffice. 
 120. See, e.g., Hayford v. Hayford, 760 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (ban on firearms 
endangers respondent’s profession as a gunsmith). 
 121. See, e.g., Overstreet v. Kixmiller, 120 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Tibor v. Lund, 
599 N.W.2d 301, 305 (N.D. 1999). For comparison of the role of stigma in civil and criminal law, see 
W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117 (2011). 
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factor in favor of issuing a new order.122 A judge in an unrelated criminal 
proceeding would be allowed to consider the existence of an earlier 
harassment order as an indicator of dangerousness, potentially affecting 
decisions on bail or sentencing.123 Findings of harassment can lead to 
ineligibility for professional licenses that require an inquiry into the 
applicant’s good moral character.124 For respondents who are aliens, 
violation of a civil harassment order is grounds for deportation.125 And 
many of these legal effects may persist even after the order expires.126 
Enforcement errors by police. Officers who investigate alleged 
violations of no-contact orders may make unjustified arrests (or unjustified 
oral orders to move along) resulting from inattention, misinterpretation, or 
lack of accurate information. Several federal civil rights actions have been 
filed against police for arrests made when any reasonable reading of the 
order would show no violation. For example, officers in Idaho arrested a 
respondent for attending the same church service as petitioner, but if 
they had read the order it would have been clear that it did not prevent 
his presence.127 Officers in Wisconsin arrested a respondent for not leaving 
a public meeting after the petitioner also entered the room, even though 
this did not constitute a forbidden approaching of the petitioner.128 
Enforcement errors by courts. Courts sometimes give their orders 
surprising post hoc interpretations. For example, an elderly respondent in 
Washington, who had a history of badgering and threatening neighbors in 
his senior citizens’ complex, was ordered to stay away from all of the 
building’s residents (forcing him to move) and not to keep the residents 
under surveillance.129 Thereafter, the respondent wrote about the building 
and its residents on his website, describing news he had heard about 
them through third parties.130 The trial court held him in contempt, saying 
that writing about the residents constituted surveillance of them.131 The 
 
 122. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.030(6). 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, ARMY 20030840, 2006 WL 6624335, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
Oct. 27, 2006) (in court martial, violation of no-contact order considered an aggravating factor at 
sentencing). 
 124. See, e.g., Towell v. Steger, 154 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (foster parenting); 
Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 439 (Tex. 1998) (bar membership). 
 125. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012). 
 126. Cf. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2011) (expunged state criminal 
conviction not necessarily expunged for purposes of federal immigration law). But see Hron v. Donlan, 
609 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Neb. 2000) (rejecting the argument that a civil harassment order imposes a 
stigma after its expiration). 
 127. Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 128. Wagner v. Washington Cnty., 493 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2007) (“If we were to [find probable 
cause for this arrest], the possibilities for the Metzgers to use the injunction to harass Wagner would be 
limitless; the Metzgers could follow Wagner around town and force him to leave stores, restaurants, 
movie theaters, hospitals, et cetera.”). 
 129.  Trummel v. Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305, 307–09 (Wash. 2006). 
 130.  Id. at 310. 
 131.  Id. at 309–10. 
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judge ordered respondent to remove all references to residents from the 
website, but the respondent chose to be jailed for civil contempt rather 
than comply.132 
In Ohio, a judge entered a standard domestic violence order barring a 
husband from doing anything that would cause his wife “to suffer physical 
and/or mental abuse, harassment, annoyance, or bodily injury.”133 The 
husband complained about the ruling on Facebook, writing: “If you are an 
evil, vindictive woman who wants to ruin your husband’s life and take 
your son’s father away from him completely—all you need to do is say 
that you’re scared of your husband or domestic partner.”134 The trial 
court found that his complaint about the legal system constituted 
contempt of the order not to harass his wife.135 The court ordered the 
respondent to post an apology to his wife on Facebook—and to “friend” 
her to guarantee that she would have access to it.136 These examples 
demonstrate the general principle that the contempt power is “uniquely . . . 
liable to abuse” because “the offended judge [is] solely responsible for 
identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious 
conduct.”137 
Expungement problems. Final orders expire if not renewed, but law 
enforcement databases are notoriously erratic about expunging records, 
often continuing to report vacated warrants and reversed or expunged 
convictions.138 Even if law enforcement databases are expertly managed 
to remove orders upon expiration, third parties who learned about the 
orders—such as credit reporting agencies—are under no legal obligation 
to cease reporting that the order had once existed. 
The fact of collateral consequences should not be a basis to deny an 
otherwise justified civil harassment order. If serious misconduct has 
occurred that justifies judicial intervention, then the collateral 
consequences are part of the price of misbehavior. However, their 
existence is good reason for courts to think carefully before finding 
liability: A civil harassment order is not cost-free to the respondent. 
 
 132. See id. at 305.  
 133. Kimball Perry, Ex-Husband Gets Choice of Jail or a Facebook Apology, USA Today, Feb. 23, 
2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-23/facebook-apology-divorce-jail/53221786/1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See, e.g., Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 618, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (state continues to 
disseminate arrests without conviction); Doe v. Herenton, No. 07-2875 STA, 2008 WL 2704537 (W.D. 
Tenn. July 3, 2008) (same for charges that did not lead to conviction); State v. Breazeale, 31 P.3d 1155 
(Wash. 2001) (same for convictions ordered expunged). 
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e. Judicial Incentives 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. observed a structural danger 
to free speech any time a court issues an injunction. A statute sets a 
general standard of conduct that will apply with equal force to the 
legislators who enact it, but an injunction will never apply to the judge 
who issues it. It always applies to another. For this reason, a speech-
restrictive injunction is supposed to receive “somewhat more stringent 
application of general First Amendment principles” than a speech-
restrictive statute.139 
A separate incentive encourages judges to grant civil harassment 
orders in questionable cases. While the costs of a wrongly granted order 
fall on the respondent, the costs of a wrongly denied order fall on both 
the petitioner and on the judge. No one who needs to be re-elected or re-
appointed wants to be the judge who denied a protective order in a case 
where the respondent later engages in headline-worthy violence. Wrongful 
denial could easily be portrayed as softness on crime—or its civil 
equivalent—and possibly insensitivity to women or obliviousness to 
domestic violence. It’s better to be safe than sorry. 
The Los Angeles County Superior Court recently revised its case 
management system to help reduce this political incentive. Court 
administrators sensed that civil harassment orders were granted in 
inordinate numbers, most often by judges with general civil dockets who 
would see such cases only sporadically. The Court’s solution was to direct 
most civil harassment petitions to a single judge. The volume of petitions 
allowed her to develop expertise in the area, and gave her a better sense 
of which allegations truly merited an order. She was also chosen because 
her seniority allowed her greater de facto judicial independence. As a 
result, grants of petitions fell sharply, with no observable reduction in 
public safety.140 
f. Judicial Attitudes 
On a less concrete but still palpable level, the interplay of civil 
harassment and free speech principles may reinforce some judicial 
attitudes that discount constitutional values. 
First, civil harassment petitions have the look and feel of domestic 
disputes. Even though the litigants are not intimate partners, they will 
have some sort of antagonistic personal history. The judge must function 
as peacemaker in a dispute where emotions run hot. Regulating such a 
relationship may seem to call more for the skills of a parent than of a 
 
 139. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
 140. Interview with Hon. Carol Boas Goodson, Judge, Superior Court of Los Angeles (Aug. 17, 
2012) (on file with author). 
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lawyer. The old saw that there is no law in family law applies equally well 
to civil harassment. 
Second, free speech lore is famous for its roster of unlikable 
defendants spouting unlikable expression: radicals, dissenters, heretics, 
bigots, pornographers, and character assassins. This is to be expected 
because a democratic government is unlikely to put much energy into 
suppressing well-liked speech. The respondent’s speech in a civil 
harassment case may well be antisocial or uncivil. The less attractive the 
respondent, the easier it becomes to reject constitutional arguments as 
the last refuge of a scoundrel. 
Third, throughout the modern history of the First Amendment, trial 
courts that were comfortable with existing routines needed convincing 
that seemingly mundane cases implicated freedom of expression. Not 
that long ago, the First Amendment was not about ordinary contempt of 
court, ordinary criminal conspiracy, or ordinary regulation of labor 
relations.141 It was not about talking back to police officers or insulting the 
sensibilities of angry crowds.142 It was not about commercial advertising or 
defamation.143 Until, of course, it was about all of these things.144 At each 
step of the way, some judges and lawyers were surprised to encounter 
speech arguments. The frontier has changed, but the dynamic is the same. 
In civil harassment law, as with family law, it still feels novel to raise 
serious speech concerns. Complicating matters is that judges in courts of 
limited jurisdiction tend to have less exposure to (and therefore experience 
with) sometimes complex free speech doctrines than do superior court 
judges or federal district judges. 
All of the factors described above raise the likelihood of serious 
error in civil harassment cases. The next Part describes those errors in 
constitutional terms. 
II.  First Amendment Problems Posed by Civil Harassment Orders 
Allegations of civil harassment may be arranged in a continuum, 
with one end involving no speech at all (as when a respondent 
persistently but silently follows a petitioner), the other end involving 
 
 141. See Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (conspiracy); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (labor relations); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (contempt). 
 142. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (speech to angry crowd); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (speech to police). 
 143. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 
52 (1942) (commercial advertising). 
 144. See Forsyth Cnty. v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (applying the First 
Amendment to crowd control); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (to verbal challenge to police); 
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (to labor 
relations); Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (to commercial speech); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (to defamation); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 
(1945) (to contempt of court); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (to crime). 
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only speech (as when a respondent makes phone calls and sends letters 
and emails), and most cases involving some mixture of the two. Some 
early judicial statements proposed that a harassing course of “conduct” 
must by definition exclude all speech,145 but this minority view has never 
been adopted. Most civil harassment statutes explicitly say that a course 
of conduct can include speech or other communication,146 and courts 
typically view speech as potentially harassing even in the absence of such 
statutory language. The vast majority of petitions will allege at least some 
speech as part of the alleged harassment. Then, if granted, any no-contact 
order will make at least some speech impossible (that between respondent 
and petitioner). Free speech questions are therefore inevitable in civil 
harassment litigation. 
Some courts have tried to avoid the unavoidable free speech 
questions through creative labeling. One approach is to imply that 
harassing speech constitutes its own proscribable category, like true 
threats, criminal solicitation, or obscenity.147 This approach assumes its 
own conclusion. Moreover, it is legally incorrect. As then-Judge Alito 
wrote with regard to a school’s on-campus harassment code, “there is no 
categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech 
clause.”148 It is occasionally argued that government may enjoin harassing 
speech because the regulation aims not at the content of the speech, but 
its “secondary effect” of causing emotional injury.149 The secondary 
effects doctrine enjoys little respect,150 and the Supreme Court has only 
 
 145. See Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 541–42 (Wis. 1987) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
 146. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.6(b)(1) (West 2012) (“Course of conduct [includes] 
making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an 
individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice 
mail, fax, or computer e-mail.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-8 (2012) (incorporating S.D. Codified 
Laws § 22-19A-1 (1992)) (“No person may . . . harass another person by means of any verbal, 
electronic, digital media, mechanical, telegraphic, or written communication.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-
3-507 (2012) (incorporating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b)(i) (1993)) (“Communicating, anonymously 
or otherwise, or causing a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, 
telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner that harasses.”). 
 147. See, e.g., State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360, 365 (Vt. 1997) (conviction for violating protective order) 
(“Defendant has no First Amendment right to inflict unwanted and harassing contact on another 
person.”); State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W.V. 1985) (criminal telephone harassment) 
(“Harassment is not a protected speech.”). 
 148. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); see State v. 
Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Mo. 2012) (rejecting the argument that “there is no constitutional right to 
harass an unwilling recipient”). The Supreme Court has recently rejected several attempts to recognize 
novel proscribable categories. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (false statements 
generally); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011) (violent speech accessible to 
children); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (depictions of animal cruelty). 
 149. Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d 980 
P.2d 846, 142 n.4 (1999). 
 150. See Daniel R. Aaronson et al., The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of Secondary 
Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 741 (2009); Christopher J. 
Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, and 
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used it to uphold restrictions on adult bookstores and theaters.151 Whatever 
potential vitality the doctrine has outside that context, it could not apply to 
civil harassment cases because listener responses to speech are by 
definition primary effects, not secondary ones.152 A final relabeling solution 
would be to say that respondent’s behavior is conduct, not speech.153 To be 
sure, harassment often involves nonexpressive conduct like following or 
surveillance. But our concern is for those cases where the respondent 
communicates. Relabeling the speech as conduct does not make it so.154 
This Part examines the three First Amendment problems most 
likely to arise in civil harassment litigation: vagueness, overbreadth, and 
prior restraint. Its goal is not to argue that civil harassment statutes are 
unconstitutional on their face (although some could be), but to outline 
the many ways that civil harassment orders can be unconstitutional—or 
at the very least, pose significant constitutional questions—as applied. 
A. Vagueness 
A statute regulating behavior must be specific enough to allow 
ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and to prevent 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.155 Vagueness violates due 
process, but it also “raises special First Amendment concerns” because a 
vague statute affecting expression has a chilling, self-censoring effect on 
speakers.156 For civil harassment litigation, there are two relevant areas of 
vagueness concern: the statute itself and any order issued under it. 
 1.  Vagueness of Statutes 
“Harassment” has no widely accepted legal definition.157 Nearly two 
hundred state statutes contain with the words “harass” or “harassment” 
 
Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 1175, 1212 (2002). 
 151. See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 921 (2002); City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 
60 Ala. L. Rev. 291 (2009). 
 152. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (plurality); id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t., 533 F.3d 780, 789 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 153. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 112 (Ariz. App. 2004) (conviction for violating civil 
harassment order); State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W.V. 1985) (criminal telephone harassment) 
(“Prohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is not a protected speech. 
Harassment is not communication, although it may take the form of speech.”). 
 154. See Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of Campus Codes 
that Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 179, 194 (1994); Eugene Volokh, Speech as 
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and 
the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1336 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech as Conduct]. 
 155. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
 156. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). 
 157. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Dangerous Drift of “Harassment,” in From Data to Public 
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in their official titles, and they cover a huge range of distinguishable 
conduct. Some statutes define harassment as threats to person or property, 
actual damage to property, fighting words, yelling or profanity, physical 
contact, hate crimes, impersonation, or following another person in a 
public place.158 Some statutes identify precise activities as forms of 
harassment, such as distributing photos or videos of another person’s 
genitals, filing a landlord-tenant lawsuit in bad faith, throwing bodily fluids 
at a prison guard, aiming a laser pointer into the eye of a human or an 
animal, placing an explosive device on a building, or handing unsanitary 
currency to a toll collector.159 Some statutes protect identified people from 
harassment, including students, jurors, witnesses, bicyclists, referees at 
sporting events, neighborhood watch volunteers, tenants, debtors, and 
taxpayers.160 Harassment is both something that hunters should not do to 
wildlife161 and something that animal rights activists should not do to 
hunters.162 
Courts have thus far rejected arguments that civil harassment 
statutes using the California model are unconstitutionally vague on their 
face,163 but they are divided over the vagueness of similarly worded 
criminal harassment statutes.164 This pattern may reflect the heightened 
 
Policy: Affirmative Action, Sexual Harassment, Domestic Violence and Social Welfare (Rita J. 
Simon ed., 1996). 
 158. See Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (2010) (fighting words); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111(1)(a) 
(2012) (physical contact); id. § 18-9-111(1)(b) (yelling or profanity); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106(1)(b) 
(2009) (threats to property); id. § 711-1106.6 (impersonation); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-803 
(LexisNexis 2012) (following another person in a public place); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-221 (2011) 
(hate crimes); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(a)(c) (2011) (threats to a person); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9A.36.080(1)(b) (2012) (damage to property). 
 159. See Alaska Stat. § 11.61.118 (throwing bodily fluids at a prison guard); id.§ 11.61.120(a)(6) 
(distributing photos or videos of another person’s genitals); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4127(h) (2006) 
(handing unsanitary currency to a toll collector); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 136-2 (aiming a laser pointer into 
the eye of a human or an animal); Iowa Code § 708.7(i)(a)(2) (2011) (placing an explosive device on a 
building); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.004 (West 2011) (filing a landlord-tenant lawsuit in bad faith). 
 160. See Ala. Code § 13A-11-144 (2011) (referees); Ark. Code Ann. § 17-24-505 (2009) (debtors); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-106 (debtors); id. § 18-8-614 (jurors); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82q (2012) 
(witnesses); Fla. Stat. § 843.20 (2012) (neighborhood watch volunteers); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-917A 
(2012) (students); id. § 163-4004 (taxpayers); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:201 (2009) (bicyclists); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 118B.210 (2011) (tenants); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-09-04 (2009) (jurors). 
 161. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-6-128. 
 162. See Frank J. Wozniak, Validity and Construction of Statutes Prohibiting Harassment of 
Hunters, Fishermen, or Trappers, 17 A.L.R. 5th 837 (2005). In North Carolina, harassment is also 
something that an animal rights activist should not do to wildlife in order to disrupt hunting. See N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 113-295 (2009). 
 163. See, e.g., Smith v. Martens, 106 P.3d 28 (Kan. 2005); State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357 (Me. 1990); 
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Curington v. Moon, No. 22809, 2009 
WL 1800373 (Ohio Ct. App. June 19, 2009); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1987). 
 164. Compare City of Longmont v. Gomez, 843 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Colo. 1993) (vague), and State v. 
Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 216 (Kan. 1996) (vague), with Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 36 (Del. 1996) (not 
vague), and State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237, 1238 (R.I. 1996) (not vague). A good summary of the terrain 
can be found in the majority and dissenting opinions in Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851 (Md. 2001). 
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concern for the rights of the criminal accused: Courts are less tolerant of 
vague criminal laws than vague civil laws.165 It also proves that vagueness, 
“like beauty, may be in the eye of the beholder.”166 
We may begin by asking whether the unmodified words “harass” or 
“harassment” are vague. Courts disagree. The Second Circuit, ruling on a 
criminal statute forbidding harassment of hunters, said the word 
“harassment” is so vague that it “can mean anything”—indeed, it is so 
devoid of content that a court could not even propose a limiting 
construction.167 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, upholding a civil 
harassment statute, said “harass” has a meaning that “can be readily 
ascertained by consulting a recognized dictionary.”168 (The dictionary’s 
definition was “to worry and impede by repeated attacks, to vex, trouble 
or annoy continually or chronically, to plague, bedevil or badger.”169) A 
federal district court in Florida, considering a statute that would impose 
professional discipline on physicians who “unnecessarily harass a patient 
about firearm ownership,”170 agreed that the word “harass” has an 
“ordinary meaning that [is] readily clear to persons of common 
intelligence,” although the court did not say what that meaning was.171 The 
Florida statute was nonetheless unconstitutional, the court concluded, 
because the term “unnecessarily harass” was vague.172 (By contrast, a 
majority of the Maryland Supreme Court found that the presence of the 
adverb “seriously” in the phrase “seriously annoys another person” 
helped save a criminal harassment statute from vagueness).173 The 
Supreme Court of Texas, considering a lawyer discipline rule against 
harassment of jurors, decided that “harass” standing alone was 
unconstitutionally vague, but the vagueness would be cured if it was 
understood to incorporate the California model.174 Inability of reasonable 
 
 165. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) (“The Court has . . . 
expressed greater tolerance of [vague] enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the 
consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 
1242, 1267 (3d Cir. 1992). Not all of the canons regarding vagueness point in the same direction when 
applied to civil harassment. While civil laws may tolerate more vagueness than criminal ones, civil 
harassment may best be understood as quasi-criminal. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. In 
free speech cases, “courts apply the vagueness analysis more strictly” and require “a greater degree of 
specificity and clarity than would be necessary under ordinary due process principles.” Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 166. People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ill. 1994). 
 167. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 168.  Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 537.  
 169. Id. 
 170.  Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, No. 11-22026-Civ, 2012 WL 3064336, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 
 171.  Id. at *14. 
 172. Id. at *13–14. 
 173. Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851, 856 n.4 (Md. 2001). 
 174. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 439 (Tex. 1998). 
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people to agree on whether a word is vague strikes me as good evidence 
that it is. 
The central difficulty with the California model is its choice to 
define harassment not in terms of respondent’s forbidden acts, but in 
terms of petitioner’s emotional responses. In Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati,175 the Supreme Court found a criminal disorderly conduct 
statute unconstitutionally vague for precisely that reason. The statute 
forbade groups of three or more to “conduct themselves in a manner 
annoying to persons passing by.”176 Because “conduct that annoys some 
people does not annoy others,” the statute relied upon an 
“unascertainable standard.”177 The vagueness was particularly offensive 
because it could criminalize assembly and expression “simply because 
[their] exercise may be ‘annoying’ to some people” (an overbreadth 
concern).178 The Coates principle—that due process forbids prosecution 
for failure to be a mind reader—has been used to invalidate many 
criminal harassment or stalking laws as vague.179 
One frequently proposed solution to the mind-reading problem is an 
intent element. Even if the respondent cannot read the petitioner’s mind, 
the reasoning goes, he can read his own mind and then refrain from 
actions he intends to be harassing. Though this logic persuaded the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code180 and some courts,181 it is unsatisfying 
for several reasons. First, as several courts have noted, it is a non sequitur: 
Knowing one’s mental state does not mean one knows which acts are 
forbidden by law.182 This is doubly so when the definition of the mental 
 
 175. 402 U.S. 611 (1971). 
 176.  Id. at 618 (alteration in original). 
 177. Id. at 614. 
 178. Id. at 615. 
 179. See City of Longmont v. Gomez, 843 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1993) (criminal harassment); 
State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 220 (Kan. 1996) (criminal stalking); State v. Sanderson, 575 P.2d 1025, 
1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (criminal harassment); City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1984) (criminal telephone harassment). Texas courts have invalidated at least three different 
criminal harassment statutes for Coates-type vagueness, see Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th 
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 723 F.2d 1164 (1984); Long v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); May v. 
State, 765 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
 180. Model Penal Code § 250.4 cmt. 6 (1980) (using “the overarching requirement of a purpose 
to harass another” to avoid vagueness). 
 181. See, e.g., People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (criminal stalking); 
State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Me. 1990) (civil harassment); State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 
824 (Mo. 1981) (criminal harassment); Superior Sav. Ass’n. v. Cleveland Council of Unemployed 
Workers, 501 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (civil injunction); City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 
572, 576 (Wash. 1989) (criminal telephone harassment); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 538 
(Wis. 1987) (civil harassment); see also M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone 
Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1408–09 (1989). 
 182. See Langford v. Omaha, 755 F. Supp. 1460, 1462–63 (D. Neb. 1989) (disorderly conduct); 
Kramer, 712 F.2d at 178 (criminal harassment); People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985) 
(criminal harassment); State v. Blair, 601 P.2d 766, 768 (Or. 1979) (criminal telephone harassment); 
State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890, 895 (Wash. 2001) (criminal harassment). 
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state uses words that may be vague when used elsewhere in the same 
statute: “Intent to harass” is no less vague than “conduct that harasses.” 
Second, the argument confuses vagueness with overbreadth. It is 
certainly true that there will be fewer prosecutions for performing Act X 
with Intent Y than there would be for performing Act X without an 
intent requirement. But at best this addresses the overbreadth question 
of how much is prohibited, not the vagueness question of what is 
prohibited. Moreover, not all courts agree that intent requirements cure 
overbreadth.183  
Third, in most areas of law, respondent’s mental state may be 
proven through inference from respondent’s actions, often on the theory 
that people intend to produce the foreseeable results of their actions. 
While valid in many settings, this concept comes with a troublesome 
pedigree when both the forbidden act and the forbidden intent are 
proven solely through evidence of a person’s speech. For example, the 
now-discredited line of espionage and syndicalism cases decided by the 
Supreme Court after World War I reasoned that the utterance of words 
criticizing the war effort simultaneously proves tendency to interfere with 
the war effort and intent to do so.184 Modern cases reject this reasoning 
and invalidate statutes that rely on an irrebuttable presumption that a 
communication proves its own forbidden intent.185 
Another type of intent element often claimed to cure vagueness is 
“no legitimate purpose” or similar language. While this theory has been 
accepted by some courts,186 the ones that reject it187 have the better of the 
argument. Labeling a purpose as “illegitimate” is no more definite than 
labeling an action as “misconduct”—which, by itself, would be 
 
 183. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 389 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978) (criminal 
harassment). 
 184. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (“[T]he language of these circulars was 
obviously intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war.”); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (“Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had 
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon 
persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.”). Similar 
inferences from speech to intent were used to uphold prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798. See 
generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reclaiming the Petition Clause: Seditious Libel, “Offensive” 
Protest, and the Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances (2012). 
 185. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363–67 (2003) (hate crime statute); Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68, 72 
(Ariz. 1972) (criminal telephone harassment); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 230 (Wash. 1993) (same). 
 186. See State v. Rucker, 997 P.2d 1080 (Kan. 1999) (criminal stalking); State v. Vaughn, 
366 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Mo. 2012) (criminal harassment); People v. Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d 412, 428 (N.Y. 
2003) (criminal stalking); Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 538 (civil harassment). 
 187. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (“The qualification ‘without 
any lawful purpose of object’ [in a vagrancy statute] may be a trap for innocent acts.”); Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 100 (1940) (“The phrase ‘without a just cause or legal excuse’ does not in any 
effective manner restrict the breadth of the regulation; the words themselves have no ascertainable 
meaning either inherent or historical.”); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1975) (criminal 
harassment); City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 992 P.2d 496, 502 (Wash. 2000) (criminal telephone harassment). 
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unconstitutionally vague.188 The labeling exercise does not provide notice 
to the actor or limit discretion by the enforcer. At best, a “no legitimate 
purpose” element “disguises the constitutional difficulties of the statute 
but does nothing to resolve them.”189 
Another argument for overcoming vagueness is more persuasive 
and has been accepted by more courts, but it too leaves some nagging 
unanswered questions. Under this approach, the Coates problem (the 
impossibility of reading a petitioner's mind) is supposedly defused by 
requiring instead that the respondent read the mind of an idealized 
reasonable person whose thoughts are presumptively known to all. For 
example, when the Kansas Supreme Court, following Coates, found vague 
a criminal statute forbidding conduct that “seriously alarms, annoys or 
harasses the [victim], and which serves no legitimate purpose,” it suggested 
in dicta that the problem could be solved by adding an objective 
component such as conduct that would “annoy, alarm, or harass a 
reasonable person.”190 Many courts have agreed with this distinction, 
upholding harassment formulas that include a reasonable person 
standard.191 
In many legal contexts (negligence being most prominent among 
them), we are comfortable imposing liability on people who deviate from 
what a reasonable person would do. Within free speech law, the 
proscribable categories of incitement, fighting words, true threats, and 
obscenity all involve predicting whether a reasonable person would react 
to the speaker’s expression with obedience, anger, fear, or lust, 
respectively. Adherents to the original public understanding school of 
constitutional interpretation believe it is possible to know to a legal 
certainty what reasonable people thought the Constitution meant in 
1789. American law is so comfortable with reasonable person tests that 
we call them “objective.” 
A civil harassment statute with a reasonable person standard is a 
major improvement over those without them, but it does not entirely 
solve the problem. Even though the reasonable person is a legal staple, 
we are nowhere close to consensus on what the reasonable person 
believes and likely never will be.192 The problem is especially pronounced 
when we ask under what circumstances the reasonable person will 
experience subjectively upsetting emotions. If the reasonable person is a 
person controlled by reason, the person may never feel “annoyed” or 
 
 188. State v. Adams, 866 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Kan. 1994) (official misconduct). 
 189. Bolles, 541 P.2d at 83. 
 190. State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 216, 220 (Kan. 1996) (criminal stalking). 
 191. See State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 99 (Conn. 1994) (criminal stalking); Johnson v. State, 
449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1994) (criminal stalking); see also Boychuk, supra note 58, at 779. 
 192. See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 323 
(2012). 
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“harassed.” For this reason, many legal references to the “reasonable” 
person are better understood as referring to the “ordinary” person, who 
comes complete with ordinary emotional responses (which may vary 
between ordinary people belonging to different social groupings, 
particularly those involving sex, age, and ethnicity).193 
The next question is who decides how an ordinary person is supposed 
to feel. When a legal inquiry hinges on the emotional impact of expression, 
we typically rely on a jury.194 The jury is presumed to comprise an 
emotionally fair cross section of the community. By contrast, civil 
harassment petitions are decided by a single judge. Even if we assume that 
judges, taken as a group, are emotionally ordinary, an individual judge 
may not be. Unlike a juror, a judge sitting in equity does not deliberate 
with others, aggregating reactions to form a presumably trustworthy 
sampling of public opinion. In the vast majority of unappealed cases, the 
trial judge’s inclinations are not even compared against the collective 
judgment of a three-judge appellate panel.195 
Thus when invoked within the prevailing civil harassment procedures, 
the reasonable person standard may not fully eliminate vagueness and 
subjectivity from the California model. With that said, appellate courts are 
likely to continue to hold that the statutes are not vague on their faces. 
Such holdings settle a constitutional question, but many tough practical 
questions will remain for trial judges in actual cases. Without better 
guidance on how to exercise the discretion granted by these statutes, 
decisions at trial will devolve into “I know it when I see it.” 
 2.  Vagueness in Orders 
Vagueness questions may arise for individual injunctions issued 
pursuant to statutes that are not facially vague. An injunction functions 
as “a mini-criminal statute” because a violation leads to criminal 
prosecution.196 Hence, the notion that vagueness is more tolerable in civil 
laws than criminal ones ought not apply when evaluating the clarity of an 
injunction. 
Vagueness in a final order may present itself in several forms. Some 
injunctions recapitulate the language of the statute itself, as is typical 
with injunctions that purport to forbid future “harassment,” either by 
 
 193. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the “reasonable 
woman” standard under Title VII). 
 194. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that juries are to determine whether 
sexual depictions “appeal to the prurient interest” and are “patently offensive”). 
 195. For a competing view, positing that juries may be poorly equipped to make such 
determinations, see Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
 196. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 8, 35 (1978). Some courts have alluded to this 
concept by labeling civil harassment statutes as “quasi-criminal” and therefore “subject to the 
heightened definiteness requirement” applicable to criminal statutes. Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 
552, 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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using that term alone or by reference to the California model.197 Some 
orders replace statutory terms with others that are equally or more pliable, 
such as an order forbidding “any other conduct which injures the 
Petitioner, either physically or emotionally.”198 However they are phrased, 
orders that amount to “no more harassment” without specifying the acts to 
be avoided violate the rule against “obey the law” injunctions.199 For much 
the same reason, orders forbidding future false statements—without 
specifying what they are—are unconstitutionally vague.200 
The beauty of a no-contact provision, whether in a domestic violence 
injunction or a civil harassment order, is how easy it is to enforce. Nuanced 
judgments may be required for criminal prosecution (especially regarding 
intent), but it is fairly cut-and-dried to decide whether a respondent has 
ventured within a specified distance of a petitioner’s home or workplace, 
has attempted to contact petitioner, or has attempted to keep the 
petitioner under surveillance.201 A civil harassment order lacking such 
specificity defeats its own purpose and is certain to result in varying 
interpretations, chilling effects, follow-up litigation, and surprises on 
motions for contempt. 
B. Overbreadth 
Where the vagueness doctrine concerns uncertainty, the overbreadth 
doctrine concerns scope. A law proscribing a real and substantial amount 
of protected expression is overbroad, whether it reaches the expression by 
accident or design.202 To determine whether civil harassment statutes 
forbid speech that should be protected, it is useful to consider separately 
 
 197. Fiss, supra note 196, at 13 (“Preventive injunctions have been characteristically broad . . . [and 
often do] little more than track the prohibition of the appropriate statute or constitutional command.”). 
 198. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 680 (N.D. 1994) (affirming order); see In re Marriage 
of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161, 165 (Wash. 2004) (describing an order against acts “designed for the purpose of 
annoying, harassing, vexing, or otherwise harming Andrew O. Hamilton and for no lawful purpose”). 
 199. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
65(d)(1)(C) (stating that injunctions must “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts 
restrained”); Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 200. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n., Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172, 174–78 (2d Cir. 2001) (injunction 
barring union from “ fraudulent or defamatory representations” was vague); Royal Oaks Holding Co. v. 
Ready, No. C4-02-267, 2002 WL 31302015, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a civil harassment 
order against distributing, publishing, or mailing offensive, obscene, threatening, or defaming material); 
In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d at 166 (stating that a civil harassment order forbidding “invalid and 
unsubstantiated” allegations or complaints to third parties “lacks the specificity demanded”). 
 201. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.080(6) (2012). 
 202. “[O]verbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). A law is 
facially overbroad when it extends significantly beyond its permissible scope, Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (ban on all “live entertainment”), or when it lacks “plainly 
legitimate sweep” to begin with, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). 
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speech “directed to the person of the hearer”203 and speech to the world 
at large. 
 1.  Speech to a Petitioner 
Findings of civil harassment that are premised on the respondent’s 
speech can be seen as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s “longstanding 
refusal” to impose liability “because the speech in question may have an 
adverse emotional impact on the audience.”204 Because listeners’ “reaction 
to speech is not a content neutral basis for regulation,”205 the California 
model is especially likely to trigger free speech objections. 
Much emotionally upsetting speech enjoys constitutional protection. 
But it is incorrect to say that listeners’ likely emotional reactions are 
never a basis to proscribe speech. Many of the categories of speech that 
may be penalized under the First Amendment—particularly true threats, 
fighting words, obscenity, and (arguably) incitement—are proscribable 
precisely because of their impact on listeners. So the real question is 
which adverse emotional responses are a forbidden basis for speech 
regulation. Unfortunately, the terms used in free speech cases to describe 
listeners’ emotional reactions tend to elide important distinctions. 
Consider Terminiello v. Chicago,206 where an angry crowd 
demonstrated outside an auditorium where a demagogue delivered a 
reactionary anti-Semitic speech. Police arrested the speaker for disorderly 
conduct. At trial, the jury was instructed that a defendant’s behavior 
 
 203. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
309 (1940)). See Volokh, One-to-One, supra note 41; Volokh, Speech As Conduct, supra note 154, at 1323. 
 204. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 
(2011) (“[S]peech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that expressive activity 
causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected.”); United States 
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (flag burning is protected even though “deeply offensive to many”); 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (“[I]n public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and 
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 910 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others 
or coerce them into action.”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“[T]he fact that society 
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion 
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.”); Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”). Lower courts 
agree. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“If the statute . . . would allow or disallow speech depending on the reaction of the audience, then the 
ordinance would run afoul of an independent species of prohibitions on content-restrictive regulations, 
often described as a First Amendment-based ban on the ‘heckler’s veto.’”); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 
1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that Nazis could march in Skokie even though it would “seriously disturb” 
residents emotionally and mentally). 
 205. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). 
 206. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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“may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites 
dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if 
it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by 
arousing alarm.”207 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In its 
most widely quoted passage, the majority relied on a bit of verbal jujitsu 
to declare that the vices identified in the jury instructions were actually 
virtues: “[A] function of free speech under our system of government is 
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.”208 
Terminiello was right to observe that the jury instructions overstated 
their case. Some highly protected expression may give rise to anger, 
dispute, unrest, alarm, and even death. Think of Martin Luther’s ninety-
five theses, Common Sense, “La Marseillaise,” or The Communist 
Manifesto. But Terminiello also overstated its case. The anger and alarm 
caused by exposure to challenging social ideas is different in kind from 
the anger and alarm that result from a drunkard shouting profanities in 
your face. Someday neuroscience may make it possible to distinguish 
among different angers and alarms by their neural patterns, but for now 
we must make do with verbal formulas. Unfortunately, the verbal 
formulas usually used in free speech literature—especially “emotional 
distress” and “offense”—are not as informative as they need to be.209 
To date, no civil harassment statute has been invalidated as 
overbroad.210 But criminal harassment statutes have been found overbroad 
when they lump together too many different adverse reactions to speech. 
For example, a Colorado criminal harassment statute forbade 
communication “in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm” when done 
“with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm.”211 In finding the statute 
overbroad, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that speech provoking 
“alarm” is often entirely worthy: It should not be illegal “to forecast a 
storm, predict political trends, warn against illnesses, or discuss anything 
that is of any significance. . . . The First Amendment is made of sterner 
 
 207. Id. at 3.  
 208. Id. at 4. A similar rhetorical device appeared in Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 
307 F.3d 243, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2002), which overturned a public school policy against on-campus 
student expression generating “ill will”: “As a general matter, protecting expression that gives rise to 
ill will—and nothing more—is at the core of the First Amendment.” Id. at 265. 
 209. The tendency to conflate different forms of psychic injury under an umbrella term is not unique 
to speech law. See Dobbs et al., 2 The Law of Torts § 381 (2001) (“Courts have long recognized that 
tortfeasors should be responsible for causing distress, emotional harm, anxiety, diminished enjoyment, 
loss of autonomy, and similar intangible harms. The exact form of the intangible harm seldom matters.”). 
 210. See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting a facial 
overbreadth challenge). 
 211. Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 81 n.1 (Colo. 1975). 
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stuff.”212 The Illinois Supreme Court found overbroad a statute that made 
it unlawful to make any telephone call “with intent to annoy another,” 
because it would criminalize instances where people’s wish to annoy 
others was perceived as legitimate, such as  
a single telephone call made by a consumer who wishes to express his 
dissatisfaction over the performance of a product or service; a call by a 
businessman disturbed with another’s failure to perform a contractual 
obligation; by an irate citizen, perturbed with the state of public affairs, 
who desires to express his opinion to a public official; or by an 
individual bickering over family matters.213  
In short, “First amendment protection is not limited to amiable 
communications.”214 
The requirement in almost all civil harassment statutes to show a 
course of conduct, rather than an isolated act,215 alleviates but does not 
eliminate this problem. As messages are repeated beyond the point of 
diminishing returns, they may lose their expressive value, justifying greater 
regulation.216 But before that point, repetition increases expressive value. 
This is why advertisers are willing to invest heavily in repetition. 
Calibrating the point at which repetition becomes excessive is difficult 
and will certainly vary with context. Under Title VII, the hostile 
environment form of sexual harassment can be established non-severe 
acts if they are repeated to the point of being “pervasive.”217 By contrast, 
most civil harassment statutes define a course of conduct as two or more 
related instances218—a standard similar to RICO219—which may set the 
repetition bar too low. For example, a grandmother in New Mexico was 
worried about her sixteen-year-old granddaughter living with a twenty-
two-year-old man. The grandmother called the man’s mother two or 
three times to seek her help in ending what she saw as an unhealthy 
relationship—even after the first call ended with the man’s mother saying 
she did not wish to speak to the grandmother and hanging up. The 
grandmother was convicted of criminal telephone harassment, but the 
 
 212. Id. at 83; see State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 668–69 (Or. 2008) (holding the fighting words 
provision of a criminal harassment statute overbroad under the state constitution’s free speech clause). 
 213. People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331–32 (Ill. 1977). 
 214. Id. at 332. Accord State v. Brobst, 857 A.2d 1253, 1255–56 (N.H. 2004). 
 215. Many states have statutes authorizing injunctions in response to single instances of violence or 
sexual assault, without proof of a larger course of conduct. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748(1) (West 
2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.378 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.90.005–.900 (2012). I do not include 
these sexual violence restraining order statutes within my universe of civil harassment laws. 
 216. See Brownstein, supra note 154, at 200. 
 217. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1989)). 
 218. E.g., Beach v. Jeschke, 649 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. McCarthy, 
980 P.2d 629, 632 (Mont. 1999). 
 219. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 
(1985); id. at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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court of appeals reversed. The law “does not require that on a matter of 
such obvious importance and concern, one must take no for an answer 
and never call again.”220 For much the same reason, a Missouri court 
recently found overbroad a criminal cyberharassment statute that forbade 
all “repeated unwanted communication to another person.”221 
In sum, for civil harassment statutes to avoid overbreadth problems, 
they must define with greater precision the types of emotional distress 
they seek to avoid. Part III proposes that the emotions connected to 
safety and privacy are the proper area of legislative concern. 
 2.  Speech to Others About a Petitioner 
Speech directed to a wider audience is even more likely to enjoy 
constitutional protection than speech to a private audience of one. Here, 
it is helpful to separate speech alleged to harm reputation through 
falsehood from speech that allegedly creates different harms. 
a. False Speech to Others Injuring Reputation 
Many petitioners allege that they were harassed by false statements to 
others that injured their reputation. These petitions typically seek orders 
like “stop talking to my boss,”222 “stop reporting me to law enforcement,”223 
and “stop writing about me on the Internet.”224 Using civil harassment 
standards to remedy defamation violates a host of well-established 
limitations on the defamation tort. 
American law deliberately makes defamation difficult to prove. 
Through the tort’s common law development and its constitutionalization 
after New York Times v. Sullivan,225 an array of substantive and procedural 
 
 220. State v. Stephens, 807 P.2d 241, 244 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). The court also held that the 
grandmother’s threat to report the incident to the attorney general was not the type of threat that 
could support liability. Id. at 245. 
 221. State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 519–20 (Mo. 2012). See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (invalidating the portion of an injunction that prohibits “all uninvited 
approaches”). But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733–35 (2000) (upholding a statute that forbids 
all unconsented “approaches”). 
 222. See Hunley v. Hardin, No. B210918, 2010 WL 297759, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Evans v. 
Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 863–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Faricy v. Schramm, No. C8-02-689, 2002 WL 
31500913, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Bovi v. Parask, No. C5-98-1616, 1999 WL 289245, at *1–2 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Mills v. Funkhouser, No. COA11-440, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 427, at *1–3 
(N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012); In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161, 162–63 (Wash. 2003).  
 223. See Elster v. Friedman, 260 Cal. Rptr. 148, 149–51 (1989); Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15, 
16–18 (1983); In re Marriage of Meredith, 201 P.3d 1056, 1058–60 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 224. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arlotta, No. A11-630, 2011 WL 6141651, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); 
Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 924, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Tom Parsons, Arkansas Teen Accuses 
Mom of Facebook Harassment, USA Today, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-
04-08-mom-facebook-harassment_N.htm. 
 225. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). American defamation law has not followed an unbroken forward march 
towards greater restrictions on the tort, but that has been its overall trend. See generally Norman L. 
Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel (1986). 
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rules limit defamation law to avoid its speech-inhibiting side effects. These 
limitations include: (a) truth as a defense, (b) protection for pure 
opinion, (c) the right to trial by jury, (d) various absolute privileges, 
including testimonial privilege and legislative privilege, (e) various 
qualified privileges, including fair comment, fair reporting, and 
statements in the interest of the audience, (f) the plaintiff’s burden to 
prove falsity, (g) proof by clear and convincing evidence in some settings, 
(h) a mental state of actual malice—meaning knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth—as a requirement for some forms of 
liability and damages, (i) independent review of the record on appeal, 
and (j) most recently, anti-SLAPP statutes.226 
By contrast, civil harassment is designed to be easy to prove. The 
burden of proof is low, the procedures are expedited, and the elements 
are few. None of the substantive and procedural limitations that have 
been carefully constructed around defamation law are present in civil 
harassment statutes. Therein lies the tension: A petitioner should not be 
able to evade the limits on defamation law (many of them constitutionally 
mandated) by redesignating the claim as civil harassment. The Supreme 
Court has consistently held that whenever the gist of a claim is injury to 
reputation, the plaintiff must adhere to the constitutional standards for 
defamation.227 The same principle must apply when injury to reputation is 
the basis for a civil harassment petition. 
b. Non-Defamatory Speech to Others 
Speech about a petitioner may be emotionally distressing for reasons 
other than its defamatory effect on reputation, as with messages that 
condemn or express dislike for the petitioner. The Supreme Court has 
found such speech to be constitutionally protected, at least where the 
speech involves topics of public concern.228 This is true even when the 
speech identifies individuals by name, discloses their addresses and 
phone numbers, and encourages others to contact them.229 In cases not 
involving topics of public concern, protection is still often afforded, as in 
 
 226. See generally Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation (4th ed. 2012); David A. Anderson, First 
Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 Brooklyn L. Rev. 755 (2004). 
 227. See Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“[P]laintiffs may not avoid the strictures of defamation law by artfully pleading their defamation 
claims to sound in other areas of tort law.”). See generally Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988) (outrage); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light invasion of privacy).  
 228. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 932–34 (1982). 
 229. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1971) (“Designating the conduct 
as an invasion of privacy . . . is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of 
informational literature . . . .”). 
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cases that reject liability for shunning by religious communities on 
grounds that meld concerns about speech, religion, and association.230 
The Supreme Court most recently considered hurtful but non-
defamatory speech in Snyder v. Phelps.231 The Westboro Baptist Church, 
a tiny sect led by the Phelps family, pickets near military funerals to 
express their message that “God is killing American soldiers as 
punishment for the Nation’s sinful policies”232—a sentiment reminiscent 
of Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address.233 Shortly before the 
funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, church members 
demonstrated on public land near to, but not visible from, the funeral. 
The decedent’s father Albert Snyder learned the precise content of the 
protest signs (such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “You’re Going 
to Hell”) from later news reports, which caused him severe emotional 
distress. A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Snyder, 
but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court’s opinion emphasized that 
Westboro’s speech related to topics of public concern. Some authors 
have argued, correctly in my view, that this focus was largely irrelevant to 
the outcome of the case.234 Snyder’s theory was that Westboro disrupted 
his son’s funeral, but in fact it did not. If a plaintiff may recover damages 
for speech he learned about on the news, it makes the defendant’s speech 
effectively illegal everywhere and at any time. 
Let us imagine instead that Westboro engaged in expression of purely 
private concern (e.g., “Albert Snyder is a bad man”) that was 
communicated to a large audience through picketing, television interviews, 
and websites.235 Although Snyder may have encountered the message, it 
was not directed at him as that term is used in civil harassment statutes. It 
was simply speech about him. Snyder understandably does not wish to 
have such things said, but he should not have legal authority to forbid 
 
 230. See generally Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
579 (1993); Nicholas Merkin, Getting Rid of Sinners May Be Expensive: A Suggested Approach to Torts 
Related to Religious Shunning Under the Free Exercise Clause, 34 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 369 
(2001). Non-religious shunning in the workplace is explored in Howard Zimmerle, Note, Common 
Sense v. the EEOC: Co-Worker Ostracism and Shunning as Retaliation Under Title VII, 30 J. Corp. L. 
627, 639 (2005). 
 231. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 232. Id. at 1217. 
 233. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), available at http:// 
www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html (“[I]f God wills that [the Civil War] continue until all the 
wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and 
until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, . . . 
so still it must be said ‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’”). 
 234. See Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Afterthoughts on Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 Cardozo 
L. Rev. de novo 43, 44–45. 
 235. Although it was not an issue on appeal, Westboro included some such speech on its website. 
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Westboro from communicating with others who may be perfectly willing 
to listen. This may be an area where the remedy makes an important 
difference.236 Even if an award of damages for such speech were allowed, 
a quasi-criminal injunction would not—for reasons that relate to the law 
of prior restraint. 
C. Prior Restraint 
A prior restraint is a government action making it unlawful to say 
certain things without individualized permission. Prior restraint problems 
arise for any civil harassment order that forbids speech with specified 
content, as in “Do not say X to petitioner” or “Do not say Y about 
petitioner.” Injunctions limiting speech are a “classic” form of prior 
restraint,237 and prior restraints “are the most serious and the least 
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”238 This is true in 
significant part because the initial decision to impose a prior restraint is 
made by a bureaucrat or, in the case of an injunction, a single judge 
sitting in equity without a jury. When a prior restraint is enforced 
through a subsequent criminal prosecution, the community at large—in 
the form of the jury—has no say on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
speech (or of the government’s decision to ban it).239 Its judgment is 
artificially limited to a fact question prepared in advance to favor the 
government, namely whether the defendant spoke without permission. 
This description reveals the uncomfortable parallel between prior 
restraints and civil harassment orders. Compared to subsequent 
punishment for crimes of violence, civil harassment orders are easy to 
obtain and easy to enforce. These are their chief virtues. Compared to 
subsequent punishment for speech, prior restraints are also easy to 
obtain and easy to enforce. These are their chief vices. 
Making matters worse is that an injunction against speech to third 
parties will inevitably be content based. The only genuinely content 
neutral injunction that could stop undesired speech about petitioner 
would be this: “Respondent may not communicate with anyone about 
 
 236. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort 
Law, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 473, 495–99, 505 (2011) (contrasting the need for precision in criminal law 
with the broader standards tolerated in tort law). 
 237. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“Temporary restraining orders and 
permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of 
prior restraints.”). Accord N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (“Pentagon Papers”); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Prior restraint problems can be especially acute for ex parte 
temporary orders, which are ubiquitous in civil harassment litigation. See Org. for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Fiss, supra note 196, at 28–29. 
 238. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 239. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1150 (1991); 
Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 Buff. L. 
Rev. 655, 726–35 (2008). 
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anything.” Such an order would be overbroad in violation of the First 
Amendment, would violate the equitable rule that injunctions should 
reach only as far as the harm proven, and would be so irrational as to 
violate substantive due process. The only way to avoid those problems 
would be to limit the injunction to allow some speech, as in “do not tell 
lies about petitioner” or “do not say anything about petitioner.” 
Although such orders have, unfortunately, been issued, they are 
irredeemably content based. 
The rule against speech-limiting injunctions has special application 
for defamation. The centuries-old maxim that “equity does not enjoin a 
libel” meant that the only remedy for defamation was an action at 
common law for damages.240 Within the Bill of Rights, the Seventh 
Amendment guaranteed a right to a jury trial for common law damages 
actions (including defamation actions), and it was also widely understood 
that the First Amendment incorporated the ban on libel injunctions.241 In 
1916, Roscoe Pound argued that the law should allow a final injunction 
against repeating specific falsehoods proven to be defamatory at trial.242 
Some state courts follow Pound’s approach, but most have rejected it.243 
In 2005, the Supreme Court was poised to decide whether final 
injunctions in defamation suits violate the First Amendment, but the 
Court avoided deciding that issue following the plaintiff’s untimely 
death. Tory v. Cochran244 involved a fact pattern that often leads to civil 
harassment litigation: A client goes public with complaints about an 
attorney.245 In this case the client (Tory) picketed against a lawyer (the 
well-known civil rights attorney Johnnie Cochran), holding signs saying 
such unflattering things as “You’ve been a BAD BOY, Johnnie L. 
Cochran” and “Unless You have O.J.’s Millions—You’ll be Screwed if 
you USE J.L. Cochran, Esq.”246 Cochran did not rely on California’s civil 
 
 240. See Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 389 (1886); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 
F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally Dan B. Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 7.2(14) (2d ed. 1993). 
 241. See Sack, supra note 226, § 10:6.1; Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of 
Speech § 15:57 (2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 157, 
163, 167, 172 (2007); Siegel, supra note 239, at 665. 
 242. Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. 
Rev. 640, 682 (1916). 
 243. See Animal Rights Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. App. 2004) 
(invalidating a preliminary injunction against allegedly defamatory picketing as a prior restraint); 
Siegel, supra note 239, at 657. Compare Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. 
2007) (California allows final injunctions against proven defamations), with Kramer v. Thompson, 
947 F.2d 666, 678–80 (3d Cir. 1991) (the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania does not).  
 244. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
 245. See generally Penney v. Isbell, No. C053824, 2008 WL 607594 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2008); 
Moskowitz v. Dunn, No. A114649, 2007 WL 1454764 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); Lais v. Barber, No. 
E037514, 2006 WL 1330774 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2006). 
 246. Cochran v. Tory (Cochran II), No. B159437, 2003 WL 22451378, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 
2003). 
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harassment statute, instead framing his complaint as an ordinary tort suit 
for defamation and false light invasion of privacy.247 However, the case 
proceeded much like a civil harassment petition. Tory represented 
himself. Cochran waived damages so that the matter would be tried 
without a jury. The only relief requested was an injunction, which the 
trial court granted. The order directed that in any public place, Tory 
could not say anything orally or in writing about Cochran or his law 
firm.248 The California Court of Appeal upheld the injunction.249 The 
Supreme Court granted review and heard argument, but a week later 
Cochran died, effectively eliminating any justification for the injunction.250 
Whether or not the First Amendment forbids injunctions against 
defamation, under present law a civil harassment order barring specified 
content at the very least poses significant constitutional questions. 
Beyond that legal concern is a practical one: A defamation injunction is 
unlikely to stop a pattern of defamation undertaken for the purpose of 
causing distress. A defamation injunction, if allowed at all, would only 
forbid republication of the precise statements proven defamatory at trial. 
A harasser devoted to injuring the victim’s reputation could simply invent 
a different lie that has not been enjoined.251 The only truly efficacious 
injunction against a serial defamer would take the form of “do not tell lies 
about petitioner” or “do not say anything about petitioner.” Such orders 
are hopelessly vague and overbroad, respectively. 
III.  Methods to Avoid Speech Violations 
Part II described how civil harassment statutes can lead to 
constitutional violations as applied, even if the language of the statutes is 
not so fatally defective as to be facially invalid. The canon of constitutional 
avoidance counsels that statutes should be interpreted and applied in a 
way that avoids unconstitutional results and serious questions of 
constitutionality.252 Serious constitutional questions are sure to arise under 
the California model, which authorizes injunctions (against anything) in 
response to (unspecified) behavior that makes others feel (generally) bad. 
Even if legislatures prefer for harassment to be judged against a general 
standard, as opposed to a precise rule, we can construct a much better 
standard than the California model. 
 
 247.  Id. at *1–2. 
 248. Cochran v. Tory, No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354, at *1–2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002); see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 241, at 161. 
 249. Cochran II, 2003 WL 22451378, at *4. 
 250. Instead of dismissing certiorari, the Supreme Court issued a decision vacating the injunction 
because Cochran’s death made it overbroad in comparison to any legitimate purpose. Tory, 544 U.S. 
at 738. 
 251. Chemerinsky, supra note 241, at 171–72. 
 252. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 
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The key to a constitutionally acceptable standard for civil harassment 
is the concept of unconsented contact or surveillance that threatens safety 
and privacy. As used here, contact has the meaning it takes in the typical 
no-contact order: in-person interaction or the direction of messages to 
the petitioner through other media such as phone, mail, messenger, or 
electronic communications. Privacy refers to freedom from surveillance 
or from intrusion into seclusion, as opposed to other privacy torts such as 
false light, misappropriation of likeness, or publication of private facts. 
While still flexible, this standard has far more substance than the 
California model. First, not every conceivable conduct will constitute 
harassment under this standard—only activity that results in contact 
with, or surveillance of the petitioner. Second, specifying the emotional 
harms that come from loss of safety and privacy—as opposed to sketchily 
defined emotional distress—ensures that a petitioner’s reasons for 
avoiding contact are those that society is prepared to endorse. It is proper 
to invoke the apparatus of government to protect safety and privacy, but 
not to enforce mere social preferences as occurs under the “annoy” 
standard. Third, this standard connotes that the proper remedy will be an 
order ending respondent’s contact with or surveillance of petitioner, not 
an order forbidding speech identified by its content. 
This proposed standard for civil harassment avoids most 
constitutional problems. It also effectuates the legislative purposes behind 
civil harassment laws. For example, Washington’s definition of harassment 
is a sweeping variation of the California model: “‘Unlawful harassment’ 
means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific 
person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such 
person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.”253 Yet the 
legislative findings tell us that the law’s goal is to remedy “repeated 
invasions of a person’s privacy” by authorizing injunctions “preventing 
all further unwanted contact between the victim and the perpetrator.”254 
Words like “privacy” and “unwanted contact” ought to appear in statutory 
definitions of harassment, not just in legislative findings. Minnesota and 
North Dakota, for example, define civil harassment in part as “intrusive or 
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse 
effect . . . . on the safety, security, or privacy of another.”255 South 
Carolina’s definition hinges upon “unreasonable intrusion into the 
private life of a targeted person.”256 While these definitions remain open-
 
 253. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.020(2) (2012). 
 254. Id. § 10.14.010. 
 255. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748 (West 2009); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2-01 (2009); see 
Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 686 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., dissenting) (“[T]he intent of the 
legislature was to protect the victims of stalking and intimidation from conduct by perpetrators which 
had put them in fear for their lives, their safety, their security.”). 
 256. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700 (2011) (incorporating S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(A) (1995)). 
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textured, they are a much more satisfying description of the problem the 
legislature seeks to solve. 
This Part explains how to use this proposed standard to effectuate 
the purposes of civil harassment statutes while avoiding constitutional 
objections. It begins by fleshing out the standard through comparison 
with well-understood tort and criminal law concepts. It then offers an 
approach to evaluating harassment claims that mix speech and non-
expressive conduct. If followed, this approach will in most cases ensure 
that liability for harassment rests on a content neutral basis (as required 
by O’Brien) and that a resulting injunction restricts no more speech than 
necessary (as required by Madsen). Finally, it addresses how to craft 
injunctions that act as constitutionally permissible no-contact orders 
instead of content-based prior restraints. 
A. The Core and Periphery of Civil Harassment 
Given the variety of conduct that might threaten safety and privacy, 
it is proper to define harassment through a somewhat flexible standard 
(in addition to any applicable bright-line rules). A standard can be 
applied more consistently—and in greater harmony with constitutional 
values—by identifying the conduct that falls at its core and at, or beyond, 
its periphery. By analogy, the constitutional standard “freedom of speech” 
is frequently described as having a core that protects expression relating to 
democratic self-government (including but not limited to speech about 
elections or the conduct of officer holders). At the periphery of the 
protected zone we find expression that is sometimes protected and 
sometimes not (such as commercial speech or false statements of fact). 
Beyond the periphery there is no free speech protection at all (for 
nonexpressive conduct). Protected speech remains a flexible standard, but 
having a sense of its core and periphery makes it far easier to navigate. 
By reference to well-established legal concepts from tort and criminal 
law, we can identify the core of harassment as conduct resembling battery, 
assault, threats, trespass, or intrusion into seclusion (“BATTI” for short). 
Conduct resembling outrage (intentional infliction of emotional distress) 
lies at the periphery of the definition. Speech directed to persons other 
than the petitioner, especially defamation and malicious prosecution, 
falls outside the definition altogether. The analogy to well-known 
common law concepts is deliberate. As a legal term, harassment is very 
new.257 Common law terms are very old. Centuries of development have 
given them agreed-upon contours that harassment thus far lacks. 
 
 257. Black’s Law Dictionary had no entry for “harassment” before the Fifth Edition (1979). This 
inaugural entry duplicated the definition of criminal harassment from Model Penal Code § 250.4. The 
Sixth Edition (1990) added the California model to the definition, citing as its source a federal statute 
enacted in 1982 authorizing injunctions against harassment of crime victims or witnesses, 18 U.S.C. 
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 1.  The Core: Safey and Privacy (BAATI) 
The contacts giving rise to the most justifiable civil harassment 
orders will be those that implicate safety and privacy: BATTI. It is no 
coincidence that these are many of the behaviors associated with 
domestic violence. Because the motivating concept behind civil 
harassment statutes was to expand domestic violence protections and 
procedures to other relationships, they should have their clearest 
application for conduct that resembles that model. 
a. Battery 
Common law battery—defined as unconsented harmful or offensive 
touching258—compromises both safety (through physical injury) and 
privacy (through invasion of personal space). Some civil harassment 
statutes expressly include battery within their definitions,259 and the 
California model easily encompasses it. A law like Florida’s, that 
authorizes a no-contact order upon proof of “repeat violence,”260 poses 
no serious definitional or constitutional problems. Nor would a civil 
harassment statute as applied to battery. 
b. Assault 
Common law assault is defined to include actions that cause 
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.261 Assault law 
properly seeks to alleviate the petitioner’s fear of being physically 
harmed by the respondent, and civil harassment statutes may properly be 
used in the same circumstances. 
Civil harassment statutes relax the sometimes-strict imminence 
requirement of common law assault, which supports liability only if the 
assailant’s actions imply that a battery will occur “almost at once” or with 
“no significant delay,” as when someone raises a clenched fist towards 
the head of another.262 By contrast, civil harassment may be proven 
through a course of conduct that leads to fear of a battery that is more 
remote in time. Because the prospect of future but non-imminent battery 
injures safety and privacy, this statutory extension of the common law 
tort is consistent with the core concerns of harassment law. 
 
§ 1514. The Seventh Edition (1999) and subsequent editions deleted the Model Penal Code definition, 
leaving only the California model. 
 258. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965); see also Dobbs et al., supra note 209, §§ 33–
37 (2000). 
 259. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748. 
 260. Fla. Stat. § 784.046(1)(b) (2012); see Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-152.8 (2012) (requiring proof of 
“an act of violence, force, or threat”). 
 261. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21; see also Dobbs et al., supra note 209, §§ 38–40. 
 262. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 29(1) cmt. b. 
830 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:781 
 
c. Threats of Violence 
Words alone do not make an actor liable for common law assault.263 
Nonetheless, most states have statutes criminalizing threats to injure 
persons or property, some of which are titled “Harassment.”264 The threat 
concept is sufficiently well established that First Amendment law 
recognizes “true threats” as a category of words that may be proscribed 
for their content.265 We punish true threats for the same reasons the 
common law punished assault: to protect “individuals from the fear of 
violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to 
protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.”266 This interest dovetails nicely with civil harassment law, some of 
which explicitly include threats of violence as a per se form of harassment 
liability.267 Unlike “annoy,” threat-related formulations such as “place in 
fear of bodily injury” are not regarded as vague.268 
A proscribable true threat must be a threat to inflict death, serious 
bodily injury, or serious property damage. Threatening to do a thing that 
one has a right to do, such as boycotting a business in response to raised 
prices, should not be a basis for liability. Nor should threatening to 
commit a minor legal infraction, such as jaywalking.269 A statute that 
forbids threats to perform less culpable acts may pose vagueness or 
overbreadth problems. For example, a criminal harassment statute was 
found unconstitutional when it prohibited threats “to do any other act 
which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened . . . with 
respect to his or her . . . mental health.”270 The law of extortion and 
blackmail explores the dividing line between lawful and unlawful threats, 
so it can provide a useful guide for civil harassment cases.271 
 
 263. Id. § 31. For example, anonymous threatening telephone messages saying “I’m going to kick 
your ass” were not sufficiently imminent to constitute common law assault. See Brower v. Ackerley, 
943 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Wash. App. 1997). 
 264. E.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106 (2009); Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065 (2011); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-106.5 (LexisNexis 2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020 (2012). 
 265. See generally Paul T. Crane, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1225 
(2006); Leigh Noffsinger, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment: Distinguishing 
True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 1209 (1999); Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 283 (2001). 
 266. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 388 (1992)). 
 267. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182b(a) (2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.571(1)(a) (2011); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 166.065(1)(c). 
 268. See Long v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
 269. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d 406, 
408 (Mo. 1987). 
 270. State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890, 899 (Wash. 2001). 
 271. See generally State v. Pauling, 69 P.3d 331 (Wash. 2003); Walter Block, Threats, Blackmail, 
Extortion and Robbery and Other Bad Things, 35 Tulsa L.J. 333 (2000); Stuart P. Green, Theft by 
Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44 Washburn L.J. 553 (2005). 
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The true threat standard is, generally speaking, a demanding one, as 
befits a doctrine that is most often employed as a basis for criminal 
prosecutions. This means that there may be some words that do not satisfy 
the true threat standard, yet may in context cause a reasonable victim to 
perceive threats of violence that do not appear on the surface, as when an 
obsessional stalker expresses messages like “I want to be with you always” 
or “I can’t live without you.” Threats of suicide by stalkers are quite 
common272 and imply a capacity for violence, but they are not true threats 
to the victim under existing threat law. A pattern of such messages may be 
a proper subject for a civil harassment order because they affect a victim’s 
sense of safety and privacy. However, as a legal matter they should be 
viewed as intrusions into seclusion, rather than as threats. The 
alternative—to create different true threat standards for civil and criminal 
cases—would likely result in dilution of the true threat doctrine and a 
diminution of its protections in the cases for which it was designed. 
The BATTI formula does not include fighting words, at least where 
that term refers to in-person speech likely to cause the listener to react 
with violence against the speaker.273 This legal concept arouses suspicion 
in many quarters, particularly because the law ought to punish those who 
engage in violence rather than their victims.274 However, fighting words in 
their most literal sense—words challenging another to fight—create an 
injury similar to the injury caused by true threats. These challenges 
portend violence by the speaker. Depending on the context, direct insults 
may properly be considered threatening to the extent they imply a danger 
to the listener’s safety, and hence can be the basis for a no-contact order. 
By contrast, insults that denigrate or mock without implying a true threat 
cause a different type of emotional distress that does not lend itself to 
relief through an injunction. 
d. Trespass 
In some older sources, a “trespass” simply means a wrongful act (as 
in “forgive us our trespasses”).275 Battery, assault, and false imprisonment 
are sometimes referred to as “trespassory torts” because they imply a 
“trespass to the person.”276 The concept of trespass upon bodily integrity 
 
 272. See, e.g., Sjomeling v. Stuber, 615 N.W.2d 613, 615 (S.D. 2000). 
 273. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 573 (1942). 
 274. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and 
Liberties of Speech (1995); Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 441, 
506 (2004); Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its 
Interment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129, 1133 (1993). 
 275. See Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 6 (Alaska 2002) (“The broad meaning [of trespass] 
encompasses . . . unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or rights.”). 
 276. Dobbs et al., supra note 209. 
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is, as described above, consistent with the purposes of civil harassment 
law. In some settings, so is an analogy to the tort of trespass to land, i.e., 
entering or remaining on another person’s real property without 
permission.277 Some of the purposes of trespass law—to protect privacy 
against unwanted intrusions278 and to prevent threatened or actual 
violence279—are an excellent match for civil harassment. Both provide 
legal enforceability to a person’s decision as to who has permission to 
approach closely. For this reason, a provision keeping respondent away 
from petitioner’s home is a standard feature of civil harassment orders, 
even if the harassment occurred elsewhere. 
The match is imperfect, however, because trespass law keeps an 
unwanted visitor away from property, not from people. Its protection of 
personal safety and privacy is a pleasant side effect of its protection of 
the right of exclusive possession. Civil harassment petitioners should not 
settle for protection only in locations where they have a possessory 
interest; this would turn a protective order into a form of house arrest. 
Responding to this problem, civil harassment statutes could be viewed as 
a source of portable trespass zones around petitioners, wherever they are 
located. Many privacy advocates argue that American law in general 
needs to be more receptive to the idea of privacy outside of the home.280 
Civil harassment orders are one of the existing privacy protections that 
are sufficiently mobile to protect against privacy invasions even in public 
places. 
A danger arises if the trespass metaphor is extended to resemble a 
legal power of the petitioner to command that all others stay away in all 
locations, for any reason or for no reason. In the absence of legislation 
(and sometimes even where legislation exists), there is no generalized 
duty to refrain from uninvited interactions with others.281 One may 
approach strangers for conversation on the sidewalk, knock on their 
front doors, and direct unannounced phone calls, letters, or email to 
them as well.282 If civil harassment statutes expand the common law of 
 
 277. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 158 (1965); see also Dobbs et al., supra note 209, 
§§ 49–58. 
 278. See State v. Delgado, 562 A.2d 539, 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); McCuller v. State, 999 S.W.2d 
801, 804 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 279. See People v. Wyant, 525 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 280. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the 
Integrity of Social Life (2009); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy 3 (2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2093594; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa.. L. 
Rev. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy]; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing 
Privacy, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1088 (2002); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 
72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919 (2005). 
 281. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (questioning any 
“generalized right ‘to be left alone’ on a public street or sidewalk”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 750–53 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 282. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (right to 
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trespass to land in a way that alters these customary freedoms, they 
should require petitioner to have a strong reason for wishing to avoid 
otherwise lawful contact. 
As it happens, existing trespass law contains several limitations to 
property owners’ freedom to exclude without a reason. Civil rights laws 
prevent property owners from excluding for discriminatory reasons.283 
Constitutional guarantees, including due process and free speech, limit 
exclusion by governmental property owners.284 The limitations that 
translate best into civil harassment are the rules of trespass into places 
ordinarily held open to the public, such as retail stores, restaurants, 
theaters, and taverns. In such places of public accommodation, visitors 
“have the implied consent of the owner/lessee/possessor to be on the 
premises, and that consent can be revoked only upon some showing the 
occupants have committed acts sufficient to render the implied consent 
void.”285 This legally presumed consent or license may be revoked for 
cause when there is “substantial evidence of the stay being prolonged, 
boisterous conduct, breach of the peace, blocking of entranceways, 
interference with the public, picketing, or other conduct which would 
revoke the implied consent of the owner by acts inconsistent with the 
purposes of the business or facility.”286 
This implied consent model maps well onto civil harassment law. At 
the outset, everyone has the implied consent of others to approach them 
in public (and even to knock on their doors, send them mail, or call their 
phones). A person may revoke that consent, but the withdrawal does not 
automatically become legally enforceable. The law should not issue 
injunctions to enforce social preferences, but it may do so when implied 
consent to approach is revoked for cause, as happens in circumstances 
threatening safety or privacy. 
e. Intrusion into Seclusion 
Trespass law keeps respondent’s body at a suitable distance from 
petitioner, but trespass principles do not translate well into the realm of 
disembodied communication. It is not a common law trespass to direct an 
 
pursue door-to-door canvassing); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (uninvited conversation is 
not a seizure); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to send unsolicited mail); United 
States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012) (“knock and talk” is not a search). 
 283. See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964). 
 284. See generally Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (exclusion from public housing project); 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992) (from public library); State v. Green, 
239 P.3d 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (from public school). 
 285. State v. Marcoplos, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821–22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see In re Catalano, 623 P.2d 
228 (Cal. 1981); People v. Leonard, 465 N.E.2d 831, 834 (N.Y. 1984) (trespass law enforces only 
“lawful” orders to vacate). This understanding is reflected in the criminal trespass statutes of many states. 
See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00(5) (McKinney 2008); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.090(2) (2012). 
 286. St. Louis Cnty. v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
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uninvited phone call, letter, or email to a recipient. However, the tort of 
intrusion into seclusion287 may occur through improper physical presence 
and unwanted communications.288 It too belongs at the core of harassment. 
Civil harassment law should focus on intrusion into seclusion because 
“invasion of privacy” is such a multi-faceted term. In his influential 1960 
article, William Prosser identified four separate privacy torts, and recently 
Daniel Solove discerned sixteen varieties of privacy interests.289 The 
privacy tort relevant to civil harassment is intrusion into seclusion (one of 
Prosser’s four privacy torts), a concept that encompasses both intrusion 
into one’s physical space and unwarranted contact or surveillance. Stalking 
laws, with their focus on following and watching, highlight the interest in 
seclusion against threatening people. The California model is properly 
applied against similar behaviors. 
Civil harassment statutes properly recognize that it is possible for an 
unwelcome intrusion to occur even when a person is in a public place. In 
this way, it is actually a step ahead of the tort law surrounding intrusion 
into seclusion, which often narrowly defines the legitimate areas in which 
seclusion may be expected.290 
 2.  The Periphery: Outrage 
The tort of outrage (also called intentional infliction of emotional 
distress) occurs when a person “by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional disturbance to 
another.”291 This definition shares with the California model a focus on the 
victim’s reaction to unspecified or loosely specified conduct. The result is a 
tort that “fails to define the proscribed conduct beyond suggesting that it is 
very bad indeed.”292 This makes outrage a poor tool for fleshing out the 
meaning of civil harassment. 
 
 287. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1965) (“One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person”); see also Dobbs et al., supra note 209, § 580. 
 288. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Unsolicited Mailing, Distribution, House Call, or Telephone Call as 
Invasion of Privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457 (1974). 
 289. See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 280; see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). Prosser’s four privacy torts were incorporated into the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 652B–E. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 Calif. 
L. Rev. 2007 (2010). 
 290. See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 280, at 556–57. 
 291. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). See generally Dobbs et al., 
supra note 209, §§ 385–89; Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the 
Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 983 (2008); Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum 
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by 
Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 42 (1982). 
 292. Givelber, supra note 291, at 43; see Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and 
the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 107, 196 (2010) (“[I]t has proven difficult to obtain crisp 
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The key to the Restatement definition of outrage is degree, not kind. 
The relevant conduct must be “extreme and outrageous”—“beyond the 
bounds of human decency”293—and the resulting emotional distress must 
be “severe”—“so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it.”294 This approach assumes that all forms of emotional distress 
may be meaningfully compared on a single scale: Seven units of grief are 
more severe than six units of humiliation or five units of betrayal. Even 
though all of these emotions are painful, a single scale compares apples 
with oranges. To avoid overbreadth, civil harassment statutes must be 
understood to apply to a subset of bad feelings, namely those that arise 
from threats to safety and privacy. 
The outrage analogy is perilous because the tort itself (even without 
the complicating factor of an injunction) poses free speech problems, as 
seen in Falwell and Snyder. Some commentators argue that virtually 
every outrage claim involving speech would be unconstitutional: 
Permitting recovery for unvarnished emotional distress cannot be 
reconciled with core First Amendment principles—no matter how we 
dress it up, the tort [of outrage] rests at bottom on the individual 
distress caused by the message of the speech and the sense of collective 
community outrage caused by the violation of accepted rules of civility. 
These are precisely the types of harms that modern First Amendment 
theory disqualifies as justifications for abridging speech.295 
You may ask why, if outrage is such an unhelpful analogy, it belongs 
at the periphery of civil harassment, instead of outside it entirely. I locate 
it as a borderline concept because outrage is the source of the “emotional 
distress” language found in many civil harassment statutes. Legislatures 
intend for courts to analogize to the common law of outrage, and they 
routinely do.296 While civil harassment laws are not straightforward 
codifications of outrage law, the comparison may sometimes be useful, if 
only because most people would find actions implicating the core of civil 
harassment to be outrageous. 
The peripheral relationship between outrage and harassment may 
occasionally justify courts referring to outrage concepts as a gap filler. In 
practice, however, it is hard to envision proscribable harassment that 
does not include at least some behavior resembling the core concepts of 
 
and concrete guidance on the scope of the tort.”). But cf. Zipursky, supra note 236, at 499–505 
(arguing that outrage is a well defined tort standard). 
 293. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45, cmt. c. According to an oft-quoted passage from comment 
d to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), conduct reaches this level of extremity when, “the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the 
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’.” Id.; see Dobbs et al., supra note 209, § 386. 
 294. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. j. Accord Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45, cmt. i. 
 295. Smolla, supra note 241, § 12.8 (footnote omitted). 
 296. See Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 
924, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Ellison v. Stam, 136 P.3d 1242, 1247–49 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).  
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battery, assault, threat, trespass, or intrusion into seclusion. In particular, 
it will be the rare harasser who can invent a way to behave beyond all 
bounds of decency without at least some intrusion into seclusion. Hence, 
courts should consider it a warning sign if the only tort or criminal 
analogy for an alleged pattern of harassment is non-BATTI outrage. 
 3. Beyond the Bounds: Defamation and Malicious Prosecution 
Civil harassment orders that abridge freedom of speech are most 
likely to arise when a petitioner objects to what a respondent says to 
others. Unlike speech directed to the petitioner, which has the potential 
to threaten safety or privacy for reasons described above, speech 
directed to others—even when the petitioner is the subject matter of that 
speech—implicates distinctly different interests that are beyond the 
proper scope of civil harassment law. 
a. Defamation 
Injury to reputation falls outside the proper meaning of civil 
harassment for four simple reasons: First, defamation is the opposite of 
conduct directed to a petitioner. The publication element of defamation 
law requires “that the defamatory matter be communicated to someone 
other than the person defamed.”297 Second, civil harassment is remedied 
through a no-contact order maintaining distance between petitioner and 
respondent. Such an order would not remedy defamation, which occurs 
as a result of respondent’s contacts with others. Third, the proper goal of 
harassment law is to avoid the types of emotional distress resulting from 
threats to safety and privacy, not from injury to reputation. Defamation 
may be emotionally distressing, but in a conceptually different way.298 
Fourth, defamation law is subject to significant constitutional limitations 
on liability for falsehood that cannot be evaded by reframing the 
allegations as harassment. 
One could argue that civil harassment should include defamation due 
to the historic linkage between defamation and privacy. The connection is 
closest with regard to the privacy torts known as public disclosure of 
private facts299 and presentation of facts in a false light,300 which share 
with defamation a concern for control over one’s public image. These 
torts revolve around control over reputation, which is distinct from the 
interest in seclusion that is the proper focus of civil harassment law. 
 
 297. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577, cmt. b. 
 298. This explains why, in some states, allegations of defamation are by law excluded from the 
outrage tort. See Fraker, supra note 291, at 984. 
 299. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. 
 300. See id. § 652E. 
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This prevailing conception of reputation . . . is thus not about the 
“private” at all. By protecting a person’s reputation, defamation law 
protects a form of intangible property, his stature in the marketplace 
and the broader public sphere. Defamation law treats an individual’s 
reputation like the goodwill associated with a business, seeking to 
protect it as property that the individual has worked to develop or 
earn.301 
Even though defamation is incompatible with the basic notion of 
unwanted contact, some civil harassment statutes expressly include 
defamation within their statutory definitions.302 Even without such 
statutory language, some courts have been willing to treat defamation as 
harassment.303 Defamation claims masquerading as harassment give rise 
to more constitutionally questionable harassment orders than any other 
fact pattern. 
b. Malicious Prosecution 
One group of allegedly false statements that civil harassment 
petitioners often seek to enjoin are respondents’ reports about petitioners 
to police, administrative agencies, or courts. The proper legal claims to 
assert against one who instigates criminal or civil charges without 
probable cause are malicious prosecution or similar variations on the 
theme of wrongful civil litigation.304 Such claims are beyond the scope of 
civil harassment law for much the same reasons as defamation. The 
alleged wrongdoing is not contact with the petitioner that threatens 
safety or privacy, but speech to a third party: the government. Society’s 
strong interest in preserving open communication between citizens and 
the government finds expression in many legal rules, including the 
petition clause, common law immunities, and anti-SLAPP statutes. If 
necessary, the government may pursue its interest in receiving only 
truthful complaints through enforcement of false reporting and perjury 
laws; the civil harassment statute does not authorize petitioners to act as 
 
 301. Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 Md. L. Rev. 
401, 415 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 302. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1809(R) (2012); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1)(b) (LexisNexis 
2012) (including in the definition of a harassing course of conduct communicating to or about a person 
and disseminating information about a person). The Bouvier Law Dictionary follows this pattern to 
define harassment as “conduct or communications to or about an individual . . . that is intended to 
inconvenience, alarm, or offend the victim.” The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary 1173 
(2011) (emphasis added). 
 303. See, e.g., Herbst v. Herbst, No. A05-945, 2006 WL 279100, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2006); 
State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 865 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 540 
(Wis. 1987); Lanetta v. Diana, No. 2008AP3165, 2010 Wis. App. LEXIS 120, at *3–6 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 9, 2010). 
 304. See Dobbs et al., supra note 209, §§ 585, 592. 
838 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:781 
 
private attorneys general to vindicate those interests. Injunctions 
purporting to limit a respondent’s ability to litigate are improper.305 
B. Replacing Content with Contacts 
The problem of content neutrality lurks throughout much civil 
harassment litigation because the petitioner’s emotional state is often a 
reaction to the content of respondent’s speech. The constitutional evil of 
content discrimination can often be avoided in practice by recasting 
allegations about content as allegations about unwanted contact. Ending 
unconsented contact (regardless of the content that may be conveyed 
during the contact) is a permissible exercise of the government’s power 
to regulate, on a content neutral basis, the noncommunicative aspects of 
expressive activity. 
The expressive conduct doctrine, exemplified by United States v. 
O’Brien, recognizes that nonverbal activity (like burning one’s draft 
card) can be communicative, but that the “nonspeech elements” of that 
activity may be subject to content neutral regulations—even though they 
have incidental impact on the ability to communicate—if the government 
interest is strong enough and the means are narrow enough.306 O’Brien’s 
form of intermediate scrutiny is usually regarded as functionally 
equivalent to the test used for governmental regulation of the time, 
place, or manner of expression.307 Content neutrality should be evaluated 
the same way in civil harassment cases as in time, place, or manner cases. 
So should the strength of the government’s interest (an intermediate 
“importance” test). The part of the test that considers the fit between 
means and ends, however, must be evaluated somewhat differently. 
Ordinarily a time-place-manner restriction is reasonable if the 
government’s chosen methods to serve important content neutral goals do 
not restrict substantially more speech than necessary,308 but under Madsen 
an analogous injunction—one that imposed the same terms but only 
upon judicially specified persons—must restrict no more speech than 
necessary.309 
 
 305. Dan B. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 2.9(4) (2d ed. 1993). 
 306. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the 
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
 307. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (“The O’Brien test ‘in the last 
analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.’”). 
 308. See id. (“[W]e reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected 
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content neutral interests but 
that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”). 
 309. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“[W]hen evaluating a content 
neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently 
rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more 
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest”). Accord Carroll v. Princess Anne, 
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 1.  Content Neutrality 
Are civil harassment statutes content neutral? In form, most of them 
appear to be. They apply to both expressive and nonexpressive activity: 
Even statutes stating that a harassing course of conduct may include 
speech do not limit their scope to harassment through words. Next, the 
statutes do not identify, by reference to specified content, any particular 
speech to forbid (other than true threats, which are independently 
proscribable). The legislature’s purpose is to protect petitioners’ safety 
and privacy rather than to suppress particular content. Finally, “the fact 
that [an] injunction cover[s] people with a particular viewpoint does not 
itself render the injunction content or viewpoint based.”310 
Although the statutes may be content neutral, individual petitions 
and orders may be content based as applied311 where petitioner’s emotional 
distress arises from the communicative impact of respondent’s message. 
But the true source of distress may be the fact of unwanted contact, rather 
than the content of messages delivered during that contact. If a 
respondent makes five phone calls a day after being asked to stop, a no-
contact order could be proper whether the calls said “I hate you” or “I 
love you.” For example, in Welsh v. Johnson,312 the respondent anti-
abortion protestor demonstrated outside the home of the petitioner 
clinic worker, telling her “God loves you and so do I.”313 These are 
ordinarily considered laudable sentiments—constitutionally protected 
ones, too. Yet the no-contact order was properly entered because it was 
triggered by contact, not content. 
In practice, pro se petitioners are likely to describe the content of 
respondent’s speech, and attribute their emotional distress to the 
content. An otherwise proper petition should not be denied merely 
because it contains some improper allegations. A court may control for 
this problem by mentally redacting each allegation that describes the 
content of (non-threatening) speech, so that the allegation amounts to a 
description of the time, place, and manner of the communication. The 
pattern of contact that remains, after excising the content, may be 
sufficient to justify a finding of harassment. If a court enters an order 
without considering what respondent said, the regulation should be 
content neutral.314 
 
393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (“[Speech-related injunctions] must be couched in the narrowest terms that 
will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs 
of the public order.”). 
 310. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763. 
 311. See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 154, at 1286 (content neutral statutes may become 
content based as applied). 
 312. 508 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 313.  Id. at 215–16. 
 314. See State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“Our inquiry is whether there was a 
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The proposal to replace content with contact may leave behind a 
nagging worry: Is it really possible? The identity of the speaker is part of 
a message’s content,315 and governmental control over who speaks is 
often treated as a control over content.316 The pattern of repeated contact 
still communicates something—namely, that the respondent wants to be 
involved with (or control aspects of) petitioner’s life. Ultimately, these 
concerns are not fatal because, if accepted, they would also leave us 
powerless to proscribe nonverbal stalking because it communicates the 
same message. Losing that message is an acceptable incidental cost of 
conduct regulation, assuming that regulation is otherwise valid. 
 2.  Government Interest 
The governmental interests in support of civil harassment orders are 
certainly important enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Public safety 
is a very strong government interest, and it may be pursued through court 
orders that protect individuals’ private safety.317 Preserving seclusion is 
also an important interest. In upholding an ordinance against residential 
picketing, Frisby v. Schultz noted that “the State may legislate to protect 
[the] ability to avoid intrusions.”318 This interest may be stronger if the 
petitioner is a captive audience,319 but in the absence of special 
circumstances making self-help unrealistic, the typical civil harassment 
petitioner is not a captive.320 
 
factual basis for the anti-harassment order, excluding consideration of the protected speech and 
picketing.” (footnote omitted)); see also ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 795–96 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 1998)) (ordinance is content 
based if it requires law enforcement officer to read a message). 
 315. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“Speech restrictions 
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”); McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994). 
 316. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”). See generally Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455 (1980); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 317. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). 
 318. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) 
(“The ability of government . . . to shut off discourse . . . [is] dependent upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”). 
 319. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (“[O]ur cases have repeatedly recognized the 
interests of unwilling listeners in situations where the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the 
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) 
(holding that the state has “correspondingly greater” interest in protecting persons who are “vulnerable 
to injury”). See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357 
(2001); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 85 (1991). 
 320. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (attendee at funeral is not a captive of 
nearby picketers); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (persons 
present at a city park are not captives of traveling performers). 
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 3.  Tailoring 
Most narrow tailoring questions will be resolved in conjunction with 
the remedy, discussed more below. The short version is that a content 
neutral no-contact order will ordinarily be a well-tailored remedy, even 
heeding the instruction from Madsen that an injunction affecting speech 
must affect no more expression than necessary. 
One additional consideration, sometimes discussed as part of the 
government interest inquiry,321 could become relevant during the tailoring 
inquiry: namely, whether the respondent’s speech involves a topic of public 
concern. Some civil harassment decisions have stated that the First 
Amendment protects only speech on topics of public concern, so that 
harassing interpersonal communications may be enjoined without any 
need to consider the free speech clause.322 This is clearly wrong: Speech on 
matters of private concern is “not totally unprotected by the First 
Amendment”323 because freedom of speech serves values of self-fulfillment 
as well as those of democratic self-government.324 The natural location 
within the O’Brien framework to consider the strength of a speaker’s 
interests would be during the tailoring step, whose nature lends itself to a 
balance of competing interests. Moreover, whether the speech involves a 
matter of public concern does not seem to fit comfortably within the 
content neutrality and government interest steps. 
Exactly how it should matter when speech is of wholly private 
concern is probably not susceptible of any grand statements. In the 
context of defamation suits, in 1971 a plurality of the Supreme Court in 
Rosenbloom said that plaintiffs must prove actual malice whenever a 
defendant’s speech related to a matter of public concern;325 in 1974 a 
majority in Gertz rejected this as a dividing line, saying instead that the 
actual malice standard is triggered only by plaintiff’s status as a public or 
private figure;326 and in 1985 a plurality in Dun & Bradstreet found that 
 
 321. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (considering 
the presence or absence of a topic of public concern as part of the government interest inquiry). 
 322. See State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Respondent’s repeated 
entreaties . . . that they resume their relationship do not contain any such particularized political or 
social message warranting First Amendment protection.”); Brekke v. Wills, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 617 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[D]efendant’s speech was between purely private parties, about purely private 
parties, on matters of purely private interest . . . [and this] is ‘wholly without First Amendment 
concerns . . . .’”); Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 680–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he person to 
person conversations between Lucy and her family members are largely unrelated to the market in 
ideas, and they are not protected by the first amendment.”). 
 323. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760. Accord United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 
(2010) (“Most of what we say to one another lacks religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from 
government regulation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 324. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 591–92 (1982). 
 325. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54–57 (1971) (plurality). 
 326. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). 
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actual malice would not be required when a private figure sued over 
allegedly defamatory statements of purely private concern.327 The notion 
is used with a bit more precision in cases where government employees 
challenge adverse employment actions taken in response to their speech. 
In that arena, existing case law protects the employees only when they 
face retaliation in response to speech on matters of public concern.328 In 
the context of outrage, Snyder v. Phelps found speech on a topic of 
public concern occupies “the highest rung” of constitutional protection.329 
Given the unsettled state of the case law, the most that can be said is 
that speech of purely private concern might sometimes receive “less 
stringent”330 protection than speech of public concern. Applying this notion 
to civil harassment orders creates a puzzle, however, because Madsen said 
courts should be “somewhat more stringent”331 about speech-burdening 
injunctions. These conflicting instructions, which arose in different 
contexts, can best be harmonized by treating lack of public concern as 
one factor in determining whether an order restricts no more speech than 
necessary. A no-contact order barring speech directed to the petitioner 
will mostly reach speech on topics of purely private concern, such as “I 
love you” and “I hate you” messages. It will not prevent speech to other 
audiences, which is more likely to involve topics of public concern. 
C. Injunctions Against Contact, Not Expression 
If harassment is found, any resulting injunction must not take the 
form of a prior restraint. Fortunately, an injunction that satisfies the 
Madsen test for reasonable “time, place, or manner” restrictions will not 
be a prior restraint.332 A proper civil harassment petition may bar contact 
between a respondent and a petitioner, but must not hinder the 
respondent’s ability to speak to others—even in ways that the petitioner 
may dislike. 
A no-contact order is content neutral: It bars contacts regardless of 
their content. This is a crucial fact, but a content neutral speech restriction 
is still a speech restriction and hence potentially unconstitutional. The 
ability to convey speech to one’s intended audience is part of expression; 
some might say it is the whole point. Hence laws that prevent directing a 
message to a particular audience are typically suspect, including those 
 
 327. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749. 
 328. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004) (per curiam); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). 
 329. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145). 
 330. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760. 
 331. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
 332. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Kistner, 
68 F.3d 218, 221 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1390 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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that make certain locations unavailable for speech.333 Despite these 
concerns, the message that might be conveyed by the fact of contact that 
includes expression—“I am here whether you like it or not”—is also 
conveyed by nonexpressive conduct, making its loss an acceptable 
incidental effect of conduct regulation under O’Brien. 
The remaining question under Madsen is whether a no-contact order 
suppresses more speech than necessary. It ordinarily will not. Ending the 
unconsented contact is necessary to the government’s goal of protecting 
petitioner’s safety and privacy. There will be questions in individual cases 
regarding the proper size of the buffer zone around a petitioner, or how 
to structure the injunction in a way that preserves a respondent’s ability to 
contact other people (such as children or co-workers) who may be situated 
closely in space to the petitioner. But as in Madsen itself, a content-
neutral injunction against contact will not be problematic. 
None of this reasoning can salvage a civil harassment order that limits 
a respondent’s communications with third parties. As explained above, 
these will arise most often when a petitioner’s allegations revolve around 
defamation or upsetting speech to third parties. Such orders will always 
be content based, so they cannot satisfy Madsen. They will also constitute 
prior restraints, because they are injunctions barring specified expression. 
The proper scope for civil harassment orders is to ban future contact with 
and surveillance of the petitioner—not to ban expression to others—
even when petitioner is the subject matter of that expression. As a 
practical matter, obeying the rule against prior restraints causes no real 
harm for petitioners, because any injunction against specific utterances 
would inevitably be too narrow to provide the desired relief.334 
D. A Case Study 
Most civil harassment petitions object to a course of conduct that 
contains both speech and nonexpressive conduct. Petruska v. Applegate-
Carlentine335 is a typical California case that makes a suitable case study 
for the methods described above. 
The petitioners (immigrants from Hungary) alleged that the 
respondents (their next-door neighbors) did a variety of un-neighborly 
things: (1) trespassing onto petitioners’ yard and removing their plants; 
(2) complaining to the city that petitioners had erected an illegal eight-
 
 333. See, e.g., Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 753 (9th Cir. 2004); Kevin Francis O’Neill, 
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 411, 446–47 (1999) (noting that time, place, 
and manner restrictions may be unreasonable if they largely impair a speaker’s ability to reach her 
intended audience). 
 334. See Chemerinsky, supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 335. No. B160936, 2003 WL 1984639 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003). The text of this Article will use 
trial court terminology to refer to the Petruskas as “petitioners” and the Applegate-Carlentines as 
“respondents.” 
844 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:781 
 
foot fence, which inspectors found to be a lawful six-footer; (3) making 
other “unwarranted and unfounded complaints” to city code enforcers, 
leading the city to refuse any further investigations unless proof was 
submitted at the outset; (4) cursing at petitioners on a daily basis, calling 
them “fucking foreigners” and “foreign assholes,” even in the presence 
of petitioners’ three-year-old daughter; (5) trampling on petitioners’ 
flowerbeds; (6) playing extremely loud music early in the morning; and 
(7) obtaining a temporary ex parte civil harassment order against the 
petitioner husband for assaulting the respondent husband, which was 
vacated after the petitioner husband proved that he was in Hungary at 
the time.336 
This record is sufficient to sustain a finding of civil harassment solely 
by reference to content neutral facts. Trespassing, stealing plants, and 
trampling on flower beds implicate the core concerns of trespass and 
intrusion into seclusion. The complaint regarding loud music involves the 
timing and volume of the sounds, not their content. Depending on the 
totality of the facts, intentionally making loud noises for the purpose of 
bothering others may be an intrusion into seclusion and hence a BATTI 
violation. 
The complaints of profanity and insults are undeniably content 
based. In some settings profanity is constitutionally protected.337 But 
depending on the context, such language may also be the type of fighting 
words that imply a true threat of violence, especially when combined 
with other evidence such as the speaker’s demeanor, expression, and 
volume in uttering the words.338 The record in Petruska may well support 
such a finding, so these threatening words can be counted towards the 
unlawful course of conduct. In addition, these events may constitute 
intrusions into seclusion, which may be judged without reference to 
content. For example, an intrusion may exist if petitioners had asked 
respondents to stop speaking to them across the fence, but they 
continued to do so in a loud and unavoidable manner. More facts would 
be needed to satisfy this approach, but such facts would involve the 
timing and manner of the communication rather than its content. 
Other allegations in the petition involved respondents’ speech to 
others, particularly complaints to city government and to the courts.339 
These allegations resemble (but probably do not rise to the level of) 
 
 336. Id. at *1–2. 
 337. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“Fuck the Draft”); Leonard v. Robinson, 
477 F.3d 347, 359 (6th Cir. 2007) (“God damn”); People v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255, 256–57 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2002) (the “cussing canoeist” case). 
 338. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008) (angry demeanor contributes to 
finding of common law assault); City of Fargo v. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d 240, 245 (N.D. 1996) 
(considering demeanor separately from content). 
 339. See Petruska, 2003 WL 1984639, at * 1–2.  
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malicious prosecution. These should not be treated as harassment, for 
many reasons. Respondents’ speech to the government is not contact 
with the petitioners. Malicious prosecution (like defamation) falls 
outside the periphery of the civil harassment standard. Speech to the 
government ought not be enjoined at all, and any such injunction goes 
beyond an order barring unwanted contact and surveillance. 
Unfortunately, the trial court in Petruska included a clause in its final 
order that prohibited respondents from filing “false reports [about 
petitioners] with law enforcement or government agencies.”340 Remarkably, 
the Court of Appeals upheld this clause, despite an earlier published 
opinion holding unconstitutional a civil harassment order that enjoined 
complaints about a respondent to government agencies.341 The Petruska 
order was justified (and the earlier decision distinguished) on the theory 
that respondents’ false complaints were part of a larger course of 
harassing conduct.342 This logic was faulty, as explained by a Texas court 
considering a criminal harassment statute: 
[T]he First Amendment does not permit a legislature to create a new 
offense by simply adding unrelated protected activity to an ordinary 
criminal law. For example, the legislature could not pass a law making 
it a crime to (1) on one occasion physically assault a government 
official, and (2) on a separate occasion criticize the official’s policies. 
While physical assaults can surely be punished, criticism of official 
policies constitutes protected expression and does not become 
actionable simply because it is incorporated into an offense definition 
alongside unprotected activity.343 
Thus, courts should not rely on non-threatening content of speech as 
a basis for finding harassment, even if the speaker is also engaged in an 
otherwise proscribable course of nonexpressive conduct. Petruska involved 
harassing conduct that justified an order against future contact with the 
petitioners, but not an order against speech to others about the petitioners. 
IV.  Recommendations 
The overarching recommendation of this Article is a familiar one: 
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Civil harassment litigation is 
conducted within a structure that pressures judges to issue injunctions and 
lowers the safeguards we ordinarily rely upon to prevent constitutional 
error. The statutes can be improved in ways described below, but in any 
system of procedurally relaxed pro se litigation with extremely few 
appeals, there can ultimately be no substitute for trial judges who are 
alert to constitutional problems. 
 
 340. Id. at *2. 
 341. See Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15, 18–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 342. Petruska, 2003 WL 1984639, at *6. 
 343. Long v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 285, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
846 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:781 
 
Readers may wonder whether my call for greater attention to free 
speech will cause too much genuine harassment to go unremedied, 
particularly harassment of women. There may well be instances where 
harassing activity in the world at large can be used to subordinate and 
deny full social participation by women, just as domestic violence does in 
the home and sexual harassment does in the workplace. Nonetheless, I 
do not believe that vigorous enforcement of the First Amendment in the 
civil harassment context is inconsistent with dignity and equality. First, 
no petitioner who can demonstrate genuine risks to safety or privacy will 
be denied a civil harassment order on free speech grounds. The petitions 
encountering significant First Amendment obstacles will be those not 
involving BATTI allegations, which are the core of civil harassment 
properly understood. 
Second, harassment as defined by the California model (unlike 
domestic violence and stalking) leads to accusations against roughly 
equal numbers of men and women.344 In the Las Vegas study, roughly 
54% of respondents were male, 42% female, and 4% undetermined.345 Of 
civil harassment cases in Utah with opinions available on Westlaw, four 
were female v. male,346 three were female v. female,347 two were male v. 
male,348 and three were male v. female.349 More empirical work would be 
needed to test the hypothesis, but women may well be the primary 
 
 344. Domestic violence is most often perpetrated by men against women. See, e.g., Mili Patel, 
Guarding Their Sanctuary on the Offense: Criminal Contempt Actions by Domestic Violence Victims in 
Private Capacity, 18 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 141, 142 (2011). The pattern is less clear for stalking. 
Psychiatric studies indicate that obsession with former intimates—the most common source of stalking 
behavior—is equally likely in men or women. See Mullen, supra note 55, at 280. In a survey by the 
National Institute for Justice, 8% of women and 2% of men in the United States claimed to have been 
stalked. Id. at 286–87. Note that the survey asked, without using the words “stalking” or “harassment,” 
whether the person had been subject to repeated behavior by another person that made them 
significantly frightened or fearful of bodily harm. Id. A majority of stalked women have male stalkers, 
but stalked men are equally likely to be stalked by a male or a female; overall, around 14% of stalking 
victims were stalked by a person of the same sex. Id. at 295. What explains the disparity between 
obsessions (which occur equally in both sexes) and reports of having been stalked (which are more 
frequent for women)? It may be that men are more likely to act on their obsessional ideations. It may 
also be that reasonable women are more likely to experience fear from similar incidents. See generally 
Caroline Forrell, Making the Argument that Stalking is Gendered, 8 J. L. & Soc. Challenges 52 (2006). 
 345. Tommasino, supra note 21, at 77. Las Vegas court forms do not record the sex (or race) of the 
petitioner. 
 346. Curtis v. Maese, No. 20090454-CA, 2010 WL 2728234, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. July 9, 2010); J.C. v. 
Blaylock, No. 20080719-CA, 2009 WL 2624115, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2009); Abernathy v. Mzik, 
167 P.3d 512, 513 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Ellison v. Stam, 136 P.3d 1242, 1243–46 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
 347. McNeil v. Hone, 267 P.3d 947, 948 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Bott v. Osburn, 257 P.3d 1022, 1023 
(Utah Ct. App. 2011); Allen v. Anger, 248 P.3d 1001, 1002–04 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
 348. Towner v. Ridgway, 182 P.3d 347, 348 (Utah 2008); Coombs v. Dietrich, 253 P.3d 1121, 1122 
(Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
 349. Shores v. Dantine, 268 P.3d 888, 888–89 (Utah Ct. App. 2012); Bryner v. Bryner, No. 
20060405-CA, 2007 WL 1501916, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. May 24, 2007); Bosen v. Bosen, No. 20030513-
CA, 2004 WL 2688211 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2004). 
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beneficiaries of First Amendment protection in civil harassment cases 
because in cases of alleged harassment based on pure speech (usually 
related to alleged defamation) female defendants may fall victim to sexist 
stereotypes of woman as gossips and talebearers. Civil harassment 
litigation has itself been used as a tool of aggression against women who 
speak out about perceived misconduct.350 As some authors argued with 
regard to Title VII sexual harassment claims, women benefit from freedom 
of speech at least as much as men, and are at least as endangered by 
restrictions upon it.351 
A. Ideas for Courts 
 1.  Redact Speech with Non-Threatening Content from the Petition 
Most civil harassment statutes specify that constitutionally protected 
activity must not be treated as a basis for liability, and the Constitution 
itself would command the same result. The most reliable method to 
ensure that protected speech is not treated as harassment will be to excise 
the non-threatening content of respondent’s alleged speech, replacing it 
with the bare fact of contact where something was communicated in a 
given time, place, and manner. If after this mental redaction the 
allegations still describe a pattern of unconsented contact or surveillance 
that threatens safety or privacy, an order may be proper. 
 2.  Navigate from the Core to the Periphery 
At the core of civil harassment is conduct analogous to BATTI 
(battery, assault, threats, trespass, and intrusion into seclusion). A petition 
lacking any such allegations will likely rely on accusations of generalized 
outrageousness or of speech directed to others (especially defamation or 
malicious prosecution), neither of which presents a suitable basis for an 
injunction. 
 3.  Aim Injunctions at Contact, Not Content 
Both temporary and final injunctions should be aimed at ending the 
unconsented contact or surveillance, not suppressing speech with 
forbidden content. A no-contact, no-surveillance order accomplishes this 
goal. There should never be clauses in a civil harassment order that 
enjoin particular speech according to its content.352 
 
 350. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161, 162–63 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (finding, at trial, 
ex-wife’s complaints of threatening behavior by her ex-husband to be harassment, and enjoining them). 
 351. See Strauss, supra note 38, at 50; Strossen, supra note 38, at 781. 
 352. See, e.g., R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming an order that 
allows respondent to speak about petitioner, but not to her). 
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 4.  Impose Reasonable Limiting or Clarifying Constructions 
For courts struggling to apply a statute with potentially vague terms, 
reasonable limiting constructions may salvage its constitutionality. For 
example, a New Hampshire court found that the phrase “for no legitimate 
purpose” in a criminal harassment statute must be understood in context 
to mean “under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to 
fear for his or her safety.”353 A Kansas court qualified the phrases “alarm” 
and “substantial emotional distress” in a civil harassment statute to mean 
“reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.”354 Ohio’s statute on its face 
can be satisfied by any pattern of conduct causing “mental distress,” but 
the state’s courts recognize that the statute was “not enacted for the 
purpose of alleviating uncomfortable situations, but to prevent the type 
of persistent and threatening harassment that leaves victims in constant 
fear of physical danger.”355 Such limiting constructions may avoid 
potentially unconstitutional applications of statutes. 
 5.  Consider Interactions with Anti-SLAAP Statutes 
Many states have enacted statutes to curtail SLAPP suits (Strategic 
Litigation Against Public Participation), civil actions whose primary 
purpose is not to enforce rights but to silence critics through the burdens 
of litigation.356 A civil harassment petition is most likely to raise SLAPP 
concerns when the alleged harassment consists in whole or in part of 
speech to others. Whether a given state’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to its 
civil harassment statute will depend on details of its statutory language.357 
 6.  Use Equitable Discretion 
As with any injunction, a civil harassment order is an exercise of a 
court’s equitable discretion. Courts should therefore be alert to ordinary 
principles of equity, such as the requirements that there be a showing 
that misconduct would be repeated absent an injunction, that legal 
remedies would be inadequate, that a remedy should respond only to the 
offense proven, and that a remedy should not be overbroad.358 
 
 353. State v. Porelle, 822 A.2d 562, 566 (N.H. 2003). 
 354. Wentland v. Uhlarik, 159 P.3d 1035, 1041–42 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). Some statutes contain 
similar limitations on their face. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(1) (2011) (“‘Alarm’ means to cause 
apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger.”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5131(8) 
(2012) (“‘Threatening behavior’ means acts which would cause a reasonable person to fear unlawful 
sexual conduct, unlawful restraint, bodily injury, or death.”). 
 355. Howard v. Wilson, 928 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
 356. See Sack, supra note 226, §§ 10:11.2, 16:2.3. See generally George W. Pring & Penelope 
Canan, SLAPPS: Getting Sued for Speaking Out (1996) (introducing the SLAPP acronym).  
 357. Compare Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute may be invoked in civil harassment cases), with Emmerson v. Weilep, 110 P.3d 
214, 216–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (Washington’s may not). 
 358. See Brendan D. Cummins, The Thorny Path to Thornhill: The Origins at Equity of the Free 
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 7.  Red Flag Fact Patterns 
Certain fact patterns are more likely than others to raise free speech 
concerns. 
a. Defamation and Speech to Others 
Civil harassment statutes must not be used as a shortcut to avoid the 
numerous common law and constitutional limitations on the tort of 
defamation. If the gist of petitioner’s complaint is that respondent is 
saying things to others that are harmful to petitioner’s reputation, the 
case belongs on the regular civil calendar as a defamation action. The 
same applies when a petitioner objects to respondent’s statements to 
others for reasons other than injury to reputation. Such statements may 
cause emotional distress, but it is not the type of distress that can be 
remedied through a no-contact order. 
b. Internet 
No special rules are needed to analyze alleged harassment involving 
the Internet. Threats or intrusions using electronic means may be 
evaluated as if they used older technologies like face-to-face speech, 
phone calls, or letters. Some states have recently enacted so-called cyber-
harassment or cyber-bullying statutes that in most cases will not alter 
how a court rules on a civil harassment petition. When properly 
drafted,359 such statutes do little more than ensure that previously existing 
harassment laws extend to online interactions, which the California 
model already does. 
With that said, Internet communications are expression, so regulating 
them implicates the First Amendment. Except where petitioner alleges 
something akin to computer hacking, allegations of online harassment 
hinge on the content of speech. The usual rules should apply: Excise non-
threatening content to see whether the remaining pattern is unconsented 
contact that threatens safety or privacy. The precise mode of electronic 
communication may matter. Emails, texts, instant messages, and similar 
messages sent to a unique address of the petitioner may legitimately be 
considered contacts, just as a phone call would be. But writings on social 
media sites, blogs, or other web-related venues that have larger 
audiences are speech about the petitioner, rather than speech to the 
petitioner. They are no more “directed at” the petitioner within the 
meaning of the statutes than is the publication of a book or newspaper.360 
 
Speech Overbreadth Doctrine, 105 Yale L.J. 1671, 1676 (1996). 
 359. See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, Mo. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097684. 
 360. See, e.g., Towner v. Ridgway, 182 P.3d 347, 352 (Utah 2008) (interpreting a civil harassment 
order to allow online speech about petitioner, as distinguished from online communications to petitioner). 
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c. Public Officials and Public Figures 
Like anyone else, public officials (elected office holders and high-
ranking government employees) and public figures (celebrities) deserve 
safety and privacy. But the general public also has a constitutionally 
protected interest in talking about them and sometimes to them. This 
public interest finds expression in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan361 and 
its progeny, which establish that (1) civil lawsuits wielded by people in 
positions of power can resemble sedition prosecutions; and (2) people who 
reap the benefits of public power or notoriety need to develop thick skin. 
Public Figures as Petitioners. The murders of John Lennon and 
Rebecca Shaeffer show how celebrities may face heightened risks from 
obsessional stalkers. They may also have a legitimate need for protection 
from intrusive paparazzi. Like the rest of us, however, paparazzi and 
news photographers have a First Amendment right to take pictures from 
publicly available places.362 Proof of harassment will require more than 
the mere fact of photography, but no-contact orders could be proper 
against paparazzi who trespass, follow, or intrude into seclusion. 
Public Officials as Petitioners. The murders of Mayor George 
Moscone and Councilmember Harvey Milk in San Francisco and the 
attempted murder of Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson show 
how public officials also face dangers from obsessional stalkers. However, 
civil harassment petitions by public officials raise concerns not present in 
petitions by private parties. Speech directed to public officials is often an 
exercise of the First Amendment right to petition for redress of 
grievances.363 It is also likely to involve matters of public concern. A court 
should ensure that a no-contact order is necessary for the public official’s 
safety and is not simply a means to shut down a gadfly or a pesky political 
opponent. If harassment is properly found, the scope of an injunction 
protecting a public official may need to be structured differently than 
one protecting a private person. For example, an injunction to protect a 
public official may need to be more limited in space or time, or contain 
express exceptions allowing petitioner to attend public meetings, conduct 
business in public buildings, or to send written correspondence. 
Police as Petitioners. Police officers are public officials to whom the 
foregoing cautions apply, but civil harassment petitions by the police 
raise additional concerns. When police officers file civil harassment 
petitions, respondents tend to be community members criticizing alleged 
police misconduct,364 which is undoubtedly a topic of public concern. 
 
 361. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 362. See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, 
and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 367–68 (2011). 
 363. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reclaiming the Petition Clause (2012). 
 364. See generally Hunley v. Hardin, No. B210918, 2010 WL 297759 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2010) 
(upholding an order forbidding a citizen from making complaints about a police officer); Morrisseau v. 
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Even if a respondent is not engaged in protected speech and is engaged 
in behavior that is genuinely harassing, police officers have less need for 
preventive injunctions. They have the power of arrest, are typically 
armed, and are in an excellent position to protect themselves from actual 
breaches of the peace. More worrisome is the risk that an unscrupulous 
officer could obtain an order against a suspect, and then undertake 
enforcement of the order as a means to avoid the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause requirements. 
d. Institutional Litigants  
Most civil harassment statutes authorize “persons” to file petitions on 
behalf of themselves or their dependent children. Whether institutional 
litigants (such as businesses, corporations, government agencies, or 
associations) have standing will be a question of statutory interpretation.365 
In those states allowing petitions by or against institutional litigants,366 
several concerns may be present. 
Institutional Petitioners. As a general matter, it seems unlikely that 
institutional entities need protection from civil harassment because 
emotional states like fear, annoyance, or alarm are “exhibited by natural 
persons, not by legal fictions.”367 When an institutional petitioner 
complains about a respondent’s speech to third parties, it will likely 
involve public denunciation of the institution, through picketing, 
leafleting, or the like, which is likely to involve topics of public concern. 
Moreover, equity may counsel against granting a civil harassment order 
to an institution, whose interests are often fully satisfied through criminal 
trespass law.368 It is faster and cheaper to convey a trespass notice to an 
unruly visitor than to get an injunction that authorizes virtually identical 
 
Andrade, No. B172407, 2005 WL 100946 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2005) (six police officers sought civil 
harassment order against picketing and online speech by community activist). Cf. Staples v. Michaud, 
836 A.2d 1288 (Me. 2003) (civilian sought order against police chief). 
 365. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (holding that corporations are 
“persons,” but that they lack “personal privacy” under the federal Freedom of Information Act); 
United States v. Havelock, 664 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (corporation is not a “person” 
under criminal threat statute). 
 366. E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4653 (2011) (“A person who has been a victim of 
harassment, including a business, may seek relief by filing a sworn complaint . . . . ”); Royal Oaks 
Holding Co. v. Ready, No. C4-02-267, 2002 WL 31302015, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2002) 
(respondent is real estate development company); Vill. of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 565 N.W.2d 586, 
588–89 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (respondent is municipal corporation). 
 367. Diamond View Ltd. v. Herz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 651, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a 
limited partnership that owns taverns may not seek a civil harassment order against an unruly patron). 
Despite this restriction on statutory standing, California allows businesses to seek injunctions based on 
tort theories such as nuisance or interference with business expectancy. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 
Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 368. Cf. Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, 238 Cal. Rptr. 172, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (denying a 
landlord’s civil harassment petition where an eviction statute provides adequate remedies).  
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enforcement. A trespass notice is also less burdensome to the individual 
because it is a private communication between the property owner and 
the excluded person that does not carry the same collateral consequences 
of a court order. If an institution’s human employees or agents are 
individually stalked or harassed, they would have standing to obtain 
orders on their own behalf that could have the (acceptable) collateral 
consequence of keeping the harasser off the institution’s premises. 
Institutional Respondents. The institutional respondents most often 
sued for civil harassment have been protest groups, particularly anti-
abortion and animal rights activists.369 The concerns present in cases like 
Madsen and Schenck will be present here because activists’ speech is very 
likely to be directed to the general public and involve topics of public 
concern. As with injunctions against criminal gangs, there will often be 
serious due process concerns regarding notice and opportunity to be 
heard.370 The unhappy history of the labor injunction in the early twentieth 
century serves as a cautionary tale. During the Lochner era, when 
injunctions against union activity were commonplace, the New York 
Times called the labor injunction a “Gatling gun on paper.”371 Before 
these injunctions were reined in by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 
and their state counterparts,372 typical union activities—such as picketing, 
leafleting, and advocating boycotts—were enjoined on vague grounds 
that bore striking similarity to the modern theory of civil harassment.373 
Petitions seeking civil harassment orders against unions and other 
associations should be scrutinized with great care.374 
B. Ideas for Legislatures 
 1. Statute or No Statute 
The first question for a legislature is whether to enact a civil 
harassment law at all. One thing is certain: If a civil harassment statute is 
enacted, it will be used—a lot. In 2003, Oklahoma reimposed a 
 
 369. See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Sci., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 521, 530–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Due to statutory limitations on civil harassment in some 
states, these cases are often premised on common law theories. 
 370. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 611–12 (Cal. 1997). Similar problems were 
posed by labor injunctions, which were often “addressed to anyone who happened to get actual 
notice” of them. See Fiss, supra note 196, at 16. 
 371. Daniel Novak, The Pullman Strike Cases: Debs, Darrow, and the Labor Injunction, in 
American Political Trials 119, 135 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994). 
 372. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.3 (West 2012). 
 373. See generally Cummins, supra note 358; Michael H. Leroy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by 
Lethal Injunction: National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to 
Strike, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 63 (2001). 
 374. In 2011, Arizona expanded its civil harassment statute to expressly reach union activity and 
defamation; constitutional challenges to the law are pending. See United Food & Commercial 
Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, No. CV-11-921-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 4801887 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2011). 
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relationship requirement on its civil harassment statute because 
metropolitan counties were “being overrun with requests for protective 
orders.”375 States should consider the capacities of their court systems and 
make a clear-eyed decision about which social problems deserve to be 
judicial priorities. 
 2. Statutory Text 
When creating a civil harassment statute or amending an existing 
one, legislatures should not adopt the California model as the definition 
of harassment. It is not difficult to draft language explaining that 
harassment consists of unconsented contact or surveillance with a 
petitioner (not every type of conduct), that this contact must cause the 
emotions related to fear for one’s safety and intrusion into one’s privacy 
(not every type of emotional distress), and that the remedy is an order 
against contact with the petitioner (not against identified speech). Course 
of conduct requirements may benefit from borrowing the Title VII 
concept of “severe or pervasive” behavior, rather than a RICO-like “two 
or more” formula. 
Legislatures should also consider specifying what does not constitute 
civil harassment—or what terms may not be included in an order—because 
hurried trial court procedures often prevent courts from identifying them. 
Consider Minnesota. Its statute is one of the few that deviates significantly 
from the California model, including a requirement of “intrusive” acts that 
have substantial adverse effect on “safety, security, or privacy of 
another.”376 This language strongly suggests that the Minnesota legislature 
intended for civil harassment orders to issue in response to BATTI 
violations, not defamation (because false speech to others is not an 
intrusion, and because it affects reputation rather than safety, security, or 
privacy). Despite this, available Minnesota decisions reveal numerous 
civil harassment orders purporting to enjoin defamation—most of them 
upheld on appeal.377 Such errors could be reduced through explicit 
statutory language directing that (a) defamation may not be considered a 
form of harassment; and (b) orders may not restrict speech about the 
petitioner to third parties. Constitutional savings clauses cannot hurt, but 
 
 375. Press Release, Oklahoma House of Representatives, House Endorses Stricter Enforcement of 
Victim Protective Orders (May 23, 2003); see Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 60.1–.2 (2012). 
 376. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748(a)(1) (West 2009). 
 377. See generally Johnson v. Arlotta, No. A11-630, 2011 WL 6141651 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2011); Johnson v. Luppino, No. A05-1557, 2006 WL 1461070 (Minn. Ct. App. May 30, 2006); Herbst v. 
Herbst, No. A05-945, 2006 WL 279100 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2006); Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 
552 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Thompson v. Olson, No. A04-1477, 2005 WL 1432133 (Minn. Ct. App. 
June 21, 2005); Royal Oaks Holding Co. v. Ready, No. C4-02-267, 2002 WL 31302015 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 7, 2002); Faricy v. Schramm, No. C8-02-689, 2002 WL 31500913 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2001); 
Bovi v. Parask, No. C5-98-1616, 1999 WL 289245 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999); Beahrs v. Lake, No. 
C3-97-2222, 1998 WL 268075 (Minn. Ct. App. May 26, 1998). 
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they cannot be expected to carry the weight on their own. Washington’s 
statute, for example, contains several constitutional savings clauses, but 
they did not prevent a trial court from enjoining alleged defamation, and 
a court of appeals from affirming the order, before ultimate reversal by 
the state supreme court.378 
A statute along these lines might read like this: 
It is unlawful to engage in a pattern of severe or pervasive unconsented 
contact with, or surveillance of, a person that endangers the person’s 
safety or privacy and would endanger the safety or privacy of a 
reasonable person. The alleged pattern may not include constitutionally 
protected speech or activity and communications to third parties that 
do not involve threats to the petitioner’s safety. The court may remedy 
the violation only through an order forbidding future contact with or 
surveillance of the petitioner. The order must avoid unnecessary 
restriction on the freedoms of speech, press, and petition. 
 3. Statutory Title 
Finally, let me suggest that any new statute not use the term 
“harassment” because the word invites overuse. Consider Utah: Its statute 
incorporates the California model, authorizing an injunction in response to 
a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
emotional distress.379 It goes even further by including speech “about” the 
petitioner within its definition.380 Yet despite its facial breadth, Utah has 
a dramatically lower rate per capita rate of civil harassment petitions 
than the other states that keep statistics.381 Why the difference? It may 
relate to social factors unique to Utah, or to other statutory limitations. 
But some of the difference may flow from the statute’s title, which is not 
“Harassment” but “Stalking.” That choice signals to the populace, in a 
way the statutory text may not, what type of behavior the legislature 
intends to forbid. 
Conclusion 
Civil harassment statutes can be a valuable tool to protect against 
unconsented contact or surveillance that endangers safety and privacy. 
But the wide scope of their language, in the procedural context where 
they are applied, invites unconstitutional applications. The invitation 
 
 378. See generally In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2004). In 2011, the Washington 
legislature considered a bill to expressly exclude from a course of conduct any “communications to a 
third party that do[] not involve threats to the petitioner or petitioner’s family’s safety.” S.B. 5579, 62d 
Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). This provision was ultimately replaced with language indicating 
that a course of conduct must exclude “constitutionally protected free speech,” which was largely 
redundant of the statute’s existing constitutional savings clause. 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950–51.  
 379. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 (LexisNexis 2012) (incorporating Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5(2)). 
 380. See id. 
 381. See supra Table 1. 
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should be declined. The First Amendment recognizes that all members 
of society “are exposed to a great deal of unpleasant speech—to insults 
and unkindness and verbal viciousness—against which the only recourse 
is to develop emotional resiliency. The law cannot intervene in every case 
where someone’s feelings are hurt, nor would most citizens want it to.”382 
 
 382. See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 359 (internal punctuation and footnote omitted).  
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Statutory Appendix 
Twenty-three states with over 140 million inhabitants (representing 
approximately 45% of the U.S. population) have statutes that allow any 
person to obtain an injunction against any other person, without regard 
to relationship, in response to unspecified behavior that causes forms of 
emotional distress other than fear of violence.383 This Appendix identifies 
these statutes and their leading cases. It emphasizes the language within 
each statute that defines harassment in open-textured terms. Many of the 
statutes contain additional elements (such as subjective or objective 
standards of emotional distress, intent elements, or constitutional savings 
clauses) or specify some harassing behaviors (such as phone calls or 
following) not quoted here. 
 
1.  Arizona (enacted 1984) 
  1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 262 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1809(R) (2012). “Harassment” is “a series of acts 
over any period of time that is directed at a specific person and that 
would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or 
harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the 
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. 
Representative cases: LaFaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 
2.  California (enacted 1978) 
  1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1307 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code § 527.6 (West 2012). “Harassment” includes “a knowing and 
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously 
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate 
purpose.” Id. § 527.6(b)(3). 
Representative cases: R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011); Huntingdon Life Sci., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Brekke v. 
Wills, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Byers v. Cathcart, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 
15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 
 383. Statutes authorizing no-contact orders, without a relationship requirement, in response to 
actions causing fear of violence include: Alaska Stat. § 18.65.850 (2010) (incorporating Alaska Stat. 
§ 11.41.270 (2010)); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2012); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (LexisNexis 
2007); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-3 (2011) (incorporating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-3 (2004)); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 163.735 (2011) (incorporating Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 (2011)); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5133 
(2012) (incorporating Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5131). 
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3.  Georgia (enacted 1993) 
  1993 Ga. Laws 1534 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-5-94 (2012). The statutory definition of “stalking” incorporates 
a definition of “harassment”: 
A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she . . . contacts 
another person . . . without the consent of the other person for the 
purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person. . . . For the 
purposes of this article, the term “harassing and intimidating” means a 
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person 
which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable 
fear for such person’s safety or the safety of a member of his or her 
immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and 
intimidating behavior, and which serves no legitimate purpose. 
Id. § 16-5-90(a)(1). 
Representative cases: Pilcher v. Stribling, 647 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 2007); 
Thornton v. Hemphill, 686 S.E.2d 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); De Louis v. 
Sheppard, 627 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
4.  Hawaii (enacted 1986) 
  1986 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 69 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 604-10.5 (2009). “Harassment” includes an “intentional or 
knowing course of conduct directed at an individual that seriously alarms 
or disturbs consistently or continually bothers the individual, and that 
serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 604-10.5(a)(2). 
Representative cases: Williams v. Aona, 210 P.3d 501 (Haw. 2009); 
Bailey v. Sanchez, 990 P.2d 1194 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
5.  Kansas (enacted 2002) 
  2002 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 141 
A “protection from stalking order” may issue upon a showing of 
“stalking.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-31a06 (2012). “Stalking” is defined by 
reference to “an intentional harassment of another person,” which means 
“a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific 
person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, 
and that serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 60-31a02. 
Representative cases: Smith v. Martens, 106 P.3d 28 (Kan. 2005); 
Wentland v. Uhlarik, 159 P.3d 1035 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 
6.  Maine (enacted 1987) 
  1987 Me. Laws ch. 515 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4653 (2011). “Harassment” includes “without 
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reasonable cause, [engaging] in any course of conduct with the intent to 
harass . . . another person . . . after having been notified, in writing or 
otherwise, not to engage in such conduct by” a law enforcement officer 
or court. Id. tit. 5, § 4651(C) (incorporating Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-
A, § 506-A). 
Representative cases: Staples v. Michaud, 836 A.2d 1288 (Me. 2003); 
State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357 (Me. 1990). 
 
7.  Maryland (enacted 2002) 
  2002 Md. Laws ch. 26 
A “peace order” may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Md. 
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1503(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2012). 
“Harassment” includes “maliciously engag[ing] in a course of conduct 
that alarms or seriously annoys the other: (1) with the intent to harass, 
alarm, or annoy the other; (2) after receiving a reasonable warning or 
request to stop by or on behalf of the other; and (3) without a legal 
purpose.” Id. § 3-803. 
Representative cases: Davidson v. Seneca Crossing Section II 
Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 979 A.2d 260 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). 
 
8.  Michigan (enacted 1992) 
  1992 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 262 
A “personal protection order” may issue upon a showing of 
“stalking.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2950a(1) (2012). “Stalking” means 
“a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment 
of another individual.” Id. § 750.411h(d). “Harassment” means “conduct 
directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or 
continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual 
to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer 
emotional distress.” Id. § 750.411h(c). 
Representative cases: Lamkin v. Engram, 815 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2012); Pobursky v. Gee, 640 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); 
Kampf v. Kampf, 603 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
9.  Minnesota (enacted 1990) 
  1990 Minn. Laws ch. 461 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Minn. 
Stat. Ann. § 609.748 (West 2009). “Harassment” includes: “repeated 
incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a 
substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse 
effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Id. § 609.748(a)(1). 
Representative cases: Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006); Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); 
Welsh v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
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10. Missouri (enacted 1980; extended to harassment 1986) 
  1980 Mo. Laws ch. 461, 1986 Mo. Laws S.B. No. 450 
An “order of protection” may issue upon a showing of “abuse.” Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 455.032 (2012). “Abuse” is defined to include “harassment,” 
which means “engaging in a purposeful or knowing course of conduct 
involving more than one incident that alarms or causes distress to an 
adult or child and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 455.010(1)(d). 
Representative cases: Schwalm v. Schwalm, 217 S.W.3d 335 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007); Vinson v. Adams, 188 S.W.3d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); 
Overstreet v. Kixmiller, 120 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
11. Montana (enacted 1993) 
  1993 Mont. Laws ch. 292 
An “order of protection” may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” 
Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-102(2)(a) (2011). “Stalking” occurs when a 
person “purposely or knowingly causes another person substantial 
emotional distress . . . by repeatedly . . . harassing . . . the stalked person.” 
Id. § 45-5-220(1). 
Representative cases: Jordan v. Kalin, 256 P.3d 909 (Mont. 2011). 
 
12. Nebraska (enacted 1992) 
  1992 Neb. Laws LB 1098 
A “harassment protection order” may issue upon a showing of 
“harassment.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09(1) (2012). “Harass” means “to 
engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific 
person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and 
which serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 28-311.02(2)(a). 
Representative cases: Mahmood v. Mahmud, 778 N.W.2d 426 (Neb. 
2010). 
 
13. Nevada (enacted 1989) 
  1989 Nev. Stat 897 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment” or 
“stalking.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.591(1) (2011). “Harassment” 
occurs when, “[w]ithout lawful authority, the person knowingly 
threatens . . . [t]o do any act which is intended to substantially harm the 
person threatened or any other person with respect to his or her physical 
or mental health or safety.” Id. § 200.571(1). “Stalking” occurs when one, 
“without lawful authority, willfully or maliciously engages in a course of 
conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel . . . harassed.” Id. 
§ 200.575(1). 
Representative cases: None. 
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14. North Carolina (enacted 2004) 
  2004 N.C. Sess. Laws s. 1 
A “civil no-contact order” may issue upon a showing of “unlawful 
conduct.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-5 (2009). “Unlawful conduct” is defined 
to include “stalking,” which includes “harassing . . . another person 
without legal purpose with the intent to . . . [c]ause that person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of . . . 
continued harassment.” Id. § 50C-1(6)–(7). 
Representative cases: St. John v. Brantley, 720 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2011); Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 924 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 
15. North Dakota (enacted 1993) 
  1993 N.D. Laws ch. 125 
A “disorderly conduct restraining order” may issue upon a showing 
of “disorderly conduct.” N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2-01 (2009). 
“Disorderly conduct” is defined as “intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or 
gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or 
privacy of another person.” Id. § 12.1-31.2-01(1). 
Representative cases: Hoggarth v. Kropp, 790 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 
2010); Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 705 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2005); Baker v. 
Mayer, 680 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 2004). 
 
16. Ohio (enacted 1992) 
  1992 Ohio Laws 144 H 536 
An “anti-stalking protective order” may issue upon a showing of a 
violation of the criminal statute titled “menacing by stalking.” Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2903.214 (LexisNexis 1993). That crime is defined as “a 
pattern of conduct [to] knowingly cause another [person] to believe that 
the offender will . . . cause mental distress to the other person.” Id. 
§ 2903.211(A). 
Representative cases: Howard v. Wilson, 928 N.E.2d 1180 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2010); Smith v. Wunsch, 832 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 
17. South Carolina (enacted 1995) 
  1995 S.C. Acts Act No. 94 
A “restraining order” may issue upon a showing of “harassment in 
the first or second degree.” S.C. Code Ann. §16-3-1750(A) (2011). These 
crimes require a showing of “a pattern of intentional, substantial, and 
unreasonable intrusion into the private life of a targeted person that 
serves no legitimate purpose and causes the person and would cause a 
reasonable person in his position to suffer mental or emotional distress.” 
Id. § 16-3-1700(A)–(B). 
Representative cases: None. 
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18. South Dakota (enacted 1997) 
  1997 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 131 
A “protection order” may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22-19A-8 (2012). “Stalking” includes to “[w]illfully, 
maliciously, and repeatedly harass another person by means of any 
verbal, electronic, digital media, mechanical, telegraphic, or written 
communication.” Id. § 22-19A-1. To harass is to engage in “a knowing 
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously 
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate 
purpose.” Id. § 22-19A-4. 
Representative cases: None.  
 
19. Tennessee (enacted 1979, extended to harassment 1993) 
  1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 350 
  1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 435 
An “order of protection” may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601, 602(a) (2012). “Stalking” includes “a 
willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of 
another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel . . . 
harassed.” Id. § 39-17-315(a)(4). “Harassment” means “conduct directed 
toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or 
continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the victim to suffer 
emotional distress.” Id. § 39-17-315(a)(3). 
Representative cases: None. 
 
20. Utah (enacted 2001) 
  2001 Utah Laws ch. 276 
A “civil stalking injunction” may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 (LexisNexis 2012). “Stalking” means to 
“intentionally or knowingly engage[] in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person and knows or should know that the course of conduct 
would cause a reasonable person . . . to suffer . . . emotional distress.” Id. 
§ 76-5-106.5(2). 
Representative cases: Towner v. Ridgway, 182 P.3d 347 (Utah 
2008); Bott v. Osburn, 257 P.3d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Allen v. 
Anger, 248 P.3d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Ellison v. Stam, 136 P.3d 
1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
 
21. Washington (enacted 1987) 
  1987 Wash. Stat. ch. 280 
An “order of protection” may issue upon a showing of “unlawful 
harassment.” Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.040 (2012). “Unlawful 
harassment” is “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a 
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specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental 
to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” Id. 
§ 10.14.020(2). 
Representative cases: Trummel v. Mitchell, 131 P.3d 305 (Wash. 
2006); In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2004); State v. Noah, 9 
P.3d 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
 
22. Wisconsin (enacted 1983) 
  1983 Wis. Sess. Laws Act 336 
An injunction may issue upon a showing of “harassment.” Wis. 
Stat. § 813.125 (2011). Harassment includes engaging “in a course of 
conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass or intimidate 
another person and which serve no legitimate purpose.” Id. 
§ 813.125(1)(b). 
Representative cases: Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 
1987); Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 752 N.W.2d 359 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
 
23. Wyoming (enacted 1993) 
  1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 92 
An “order of protection” may issue upon a showing of “stalking.” 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-507(a) (2012). “Stalking” is committed if, “with 
intent to harass another person, the person engages in a course of 
conduct reasonably likely to harass that person, including but not limited 
to any combination of the following: [c]ommunicating . . . in a manner 
that harasses; [or] otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that 
harasses another person.” Id. § 6-2-506(b). To “harass” means “to 
engage in a course of conduct . . . directed at a specific person or the 
family of a specific person, which the defendant knew or should have 
known would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm the person toward whom 
it is directed.” Id. § 6-2-506(a)(ii). 
Representative cases: None. 
 
